Of Missiles and Teachers

Note to potential critics of this post: It is not intended to, and does not, address whether we should be involved in Syria, or what we should be doing there if we are -- especially in response to gas attacks on Syrians. It does not argue that we do not need a military in these times. Read it again.

Spending on Military Always Comes at a Cost

Nicholas Johnson
The Gazette, April 9, 2017, p. D5
My father grew up on a Kansas cattle farm in the early 20th Century. Times were tough, and so were parents. He recalled sitting on the porch steps at a neighbor's farm house when that farmer's young, barefoot boy approached and asked for a nickel. The boy's father answered, "What did you do with the last nickel I gave you?"

It's much easier these days for America's military. Often it doesn't even need to ask. Elected officials sometimes send additional taxpayers' money its way for the weapons systems of major campaign donors, weapons the military would really rather not have, thank you.

As for "the last nickel I gave you," the General Accounting Office has often just thrown up its hands in frustration and announced that the military's financial records are in a condition that simply makes audits impossible.

So estimates vary, but most agree we are spending on our military more than the next seven nations combined -- much of which is used to make sure that we could win, should we ever have to fight World War II all over again. Unfortunately, there's little that the President Gerald Ford $8-to-13 billion aircraft carrier can do to defend us from cyber attacks or terrorists' random, homemade bombs.

Throw in the cost of caring for the wounded (Department of Veterans Affairs), and other costs throughout the federal budget, and the military's share of federal discretionary spending is well over the 54% just going to the Pentagon. (Estimates of the costs of our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq alone, among the most difficult to audit, range between one and five trillion dollars.)

It's hard enough for most of us to deal with things measured in the millions of dollars. We can't even imagine how we should evaluate costs in the billions and trillions of dollars.

So let's just focus on the cost of one operation, during one day (yesterday, April 7), involving missile strikes on one Syrian Airforce base. [Photo credit: unknown; perhaps U.S. Navy]

It required 59 Tomahawk Cruise missiles. At $1.4 million per missile that's $82.6 million.

So how much is $82.6 million?

Think of it this way: Given the median income of Iowa's K-12 teachers, $82.6 million would be enough to pay the salaries of over 1700 additional teachers for one year -- roughly a 5% increase in the number of Iowa's 35,000 teachers.

That's something we can imagine.

Now multiply that by roughly 10,000 times and you'll have some notion of how much our military expenditures are denying us in healthcare, jobs programs, education, infrastructure improvements, and other pro-people social programs.

Think about what President Eisenhower's military-industrial complex did with the last nickel you gave it. Think about it -- and act.
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Nicholas Johnson of Iowa City shared responsibility for sealift to Vietnam while serving as U.S. maritime administrator. Comments: mailbox@nicholasjohnson.org

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Understanding Terrorist Thugs

If you're looking for material regarding University of Iowa, its new President Bruce Harreld, and the Iowa Board of Regents, CLICK HERE.

ISIS/ISIL is Neither Islamic Nor a State

Related: Nicholas Johnson, "Sober Risk Assessment Needed to Respond to Terror," Iowa City Press-Citizen, November 28, 2015; Nicholas Johnson, "Syria's Refugees: Job One and Job Two," The Gazette, November 1, 2015; Nicholas Johnson, "Ten Questions for Bush Before War," The Daily Iowan, February 4, 2003


Understanding Terrorist Thugs
Nicholas Johnson
The Daily Iowan, December 3, 2015, p. A4

What Motivates 'Terrorist Thugs'?
Nicholas Johnson
The Gazette, December 20, 2015, p. C4
What is the ultimate goal of those terrorist thugs in Iraq and Syria with their random, if organized, attacks on innocent Westerners?

Until we figure that out, our responses run a serious risk of making us less, rather than more, safe.

Here’s a possible explanation.

In their minds, this is not a battle against the West as an ultimate goal. It is a battle for the hearts and minds of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims, designed to bring them into the thugs’ ambit. To achieve this, they need two things. They need evidence the West is, in fact, waging a war on Islam that puts all Muslims in danger. And they need plausibly to argue they offer Muslims protection from hostile Westerners. Where? In a state of their own, their Islamic Caliphate (Arabic for “successor;” in this case successor to the Prophet Mohammed).

To do this they want and need war with the West. Like a bully looking for a fight, terrorist acts that provoke our response of war serve their cause. What better evidence of a war than our organizing coalitions, bombing their territory, and sending in troops? When our leaders oblige, and then call this a “war” or “clash of cultures,” they just help the terrorists’ cause.

When our governors refuse to accept suffering Syrian refugees or say we should admit Christian but not Syrian Muslims, it further confirms the thugs’ case. When Muslims needing our protection are rejected by us, we leave them no option but to look to these thugs for protection.

We further aid their cause when we buy into the assertion that they do, in fact, control a state, using the reference they prefer: “Islamic State” (in the acronyms ISIS and ISIL).

That is why the name used here is “terrorist thugs” rather than any mention of their “state.”

Do they enjoy killing Westerners, by whatever means? Yes. They probably even get a chuckle from our seeming inability to find them with our global, industrial-grade surveillance — and then, when we do, our failures to use and share the results.

But it’s highly unlikely they share Hitler’s vision of taking over the territory of Europe and the United Sates or killing us all. Their goal does not require, nor do they have, such resources. That’s why they welcome our providing the video images of a war waged inside their state. Meanwhile, their public-relations media experts are tasked with the global distribution of recruiting material, along with claims of credit for events such as the downed Russian airliner and the coordinated Paris killings. [Photo credit: Daily Iowan/Associated Press, Evan Vucci]

We calmly accept 30,000 gun deaths every year as our constitutional right, but panic at the prospect of up to 1/10th of 1 percent more killings from terrorist acts. We erect buildings’ physical barriers, increase military and police presence, search fans at college football stadiums, and perform a theater of ineffective “security” in airports. Since the thugs’ provocations involve terrorism rather than war, every time we appear terrorized, more points are put up on their scoreboard.

Suppose a traditional war could be fought there, with a uniformed enemy, and frontlines on battlefields (rather than killing innocents in urban warfare). Even if we won, what then? Why would it be any different from the last time, when we imposed a Shiite government on the formerly ruling Sunnis, chaos reigned, and the opportunist Sunni tribal leaders looked to the thugs for stability?

Some of these tribes have hundreds, even thousands, of years of history. The last time they helped us, we turned our backs and left them to struggle. Why should they trust us now?

But they may be our only hope. Fighting terrorism is like a game of whack-a-mole. The more we kill the more recruits they get. New thugs-in-chief replace the old. Tribal leaders are our only long term hope. In Iraq, all wars as well as politics are local.
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Nicholas Johnson, as U.S. Maritime administrator, managed sealift to Vietnam and maintains FromDC2Iowa.blogspot.com. Contact: mailbox@nicholasjohnson.org

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Syria, Terrorism, Craziness and Common Sense

If you're looking for material regarding University of Iowa, its new President Bruce Harreld, and the Iowa Board of Regents, CLICK HERE.

Sober Risk Assessment Needed to Respond to Terror
Nicholas Johnson
Iowa City Press-Citizen, November 28, 2015, p. A11
There’s so much craziness involved in our response to “terrorism,” and potential Syrian refugees. Where to begin?

Let’s start with risk assessment.

It turns out that fear of dying in a terrorist attack is like a two-pack-a-day cigarette smoker with a fear of flying.

About 3000 people died in the Twin Towers collapse, September 11, 2001. But that number die every month of every year from guns. An equal number die every month in automobiles. Over 7000 die every month from alcohol related causes. Tobacco contributes to 40,000 deaths a month – a risk for our cigarette smoker 10,000 or more times greater than airlines. [Photo credit: Unknown]

Your risks from the most bizarre accident you can imagine is greater than your risk of a terrorist act.

Will we have more U.S. radical jihadist terrorist attacks? Probably; mostly home grown. Can we stop all of them? Of course not. Would more NSA surveillance of Americans help? Probably not. There was advance intelligence about terrorists’ suspicious flight training, and Osama bin Laden’s intention to strike New York. The Russians told us about the Boston Marathon bombers. ISIS’ attacks in Paris were masterminded by someone well known to authorities. Making the haystack bigger doesn’t make the needle easier to find.

It has been suggested that we admit Christians from Syria, but not Muslims – indeed that all U.S. Muslims be issued identity cards and entered in a database.

There are so many thing wrong with such violations of our values and Constitution. We don‘t punish religions. Moreover, if we’re going to do it anyway, we need to single out Christians not Muslims. Christians have committed multiples more domestic terrorist acts than Muslims.

When emotions run high, we need to recall our shame at refusing to welcome German Jewish refugees before World War II. Provoked by politicians, Americans’ fear the Jews might be communists caused our government to turn the Jews’ boats around and send them back to their death at the hands of Nazis.

If we’re going to respond to events in Paris with anything beyond what we’re already doing, refusing to take Syrian refugees is one of the worst things we could do. Not only will it fail to make us safer, it will help to make ISIS stronger.

Focusing on Syrians rather than Europeans is like focusing on Afghans after planeloads of Saudis, funded by other Saudis, brought down the Twin Towers. Not only were the Paris bombers Europeans, not Syrians, as such they could easily enter the U.S. as tourists.

Nearly 35 million foreigners visit our country every year – many don’t even need visas. If we don’t fear admitting those 35 million, without vetting them, by what logic do we refuse to take 10,000 Syrians who have gone through years of the most intense vetting imaginable?

Since 9/11 we have admitted 785,000 refugees into our country. During those 14 years only three have been arrested on terrorism-related charges. That’s 0.0004 of 1 percent. There’s no credible reason to believe our vetting of Syrians will be significantly less successful.

Over 10 million Syrians have left their homes. Europe has welcomed them. We can’t accept 1/10th of 1% of that number?

Bear in mind, ISIS is not trying to take over our 3 million square miles, or kill our 300 million people. This is not your grandfather’s war. ISIS is just trying to terrorize us, to make us fearful. When we build more chain-link fences and hire more security guards, when we can’t enter an airplane – or even a college football stadium – without being frisked or x-rayed, they’ve won.

Our military presence in the Middle East has helped them recruit far more suicide bombers than we’ve ever killed. And our leaving Syria’s young people with no option but to join ISIS will do the same.
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Nicholas Johnson, Iowa City native, managed sealift to Viet Nam when serving as U.S. Maritime Administrator, and maintains FromDC2Iowa.blogspot.com Contact: mailbox@nicholasjohnson.org

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Syria's Refugees: Job One and Job Two

Syria’s Refugees: Job One and Job Two

Nicholas Johnson

The Gazette, November 1, 2015, p. C4

“I didn’t think we could just sit here idly and say, ‘Let those people die.’ We wouldn’t want the rest of the world to say that about us if we were in the same situation. Do unto others as you’d have them do unto you.”

-- Iowa’s Governor Robert D. Ray, welcoming Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian immigrants, 1975 (post Viet Nam War)

In March, 2011, Syria’s President Assad fired on peaceful Syrian, Arab Spring demonstrators. By July the demonstrators were joined by defectors from Assad’s army, renamed themselves the Free Syrian Army, and were engaged in a civil war. Soon Iran was supporting Assad; Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States came to the aid of the rebels.

Five years later, it has become a regional version of a World War III. In addition to Syria, it involves the countries of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey – and now Russia and the United States, among others. Other state-like groups include al Qaeda in Syria, Hezbollah, ISIS, Kurds, the anti-Assad rebels – plus another 100 factions – all of which switch sides and membership from time to time. Then there is the Islamic division, with Sunnis supporting the rebels and Shiites supporting Assad.

Nearly a quarter-million Syrians have been killed – most of whom were innocent civilians neither wishing for nor participating in this war. There are uncounted millions who have been injured, deprived of food or health care, and are missing family members. Homes and businesses have been destroyed, as have entire cities, leaving many without shelter or access to supplies.

The UN estimates 7.6 million Syrians (out of a pre-war population of 23 million) are now displaced within Syria, in addition to the 4 million Syrian refugees who have been able to leave.

Few if any of us have ever experienced anything remotely like what they have been through, and continue to experience.

But as we try to imagine what it must be like, one cannot watch the news of their lives, whether in Syria, or on their way elsewhere, and not be emotionally moved. What can we Iowans do to help from halfway around the world?

Iowans, like Americans in the other 49 states, have been, and continue to be, enriched by the diversity and skills of our new arrivals. The UI alone has students from 112 countries. And as the opening quote from former Governor Robert Ray reveals, Iowa has a proud history of welcoming those in need of a new home during Iowa’s recent, as well as its early years.

So it’s pretty clear what those of us within the Gazette’s circulation area can, and should do. We need to encourage our public officials to continue Iowa’s tradition – the presidential candidates, our Governor, legislators, county supervisors, and city council members. We need to work from within our churches, social service agencies, civic clubs and other organizations to build consensus – and collaboration – encouraging and preparing for their arrival.

That’s today’s job one in this crisis.

But job two still looms: trying to learn from this experience what America has apparently been unable to learn from our unwelcome military incursions into Viet Nam, Afghanistan, and Iraq – among many other countries.

The West created the Middle East. In May 1916, Mark Sykes (British), and Francois Georges-Picot (French), with Russia’s knowledge, came to a secret understanding to demolish the Ottoman Empire and draw new boundaries for French and British-administered areas.

World War III is not World War II. “Terrorism” is not a nation. If we wanted to treat it as such after 9/11 we should have been bombing and invading Saudi Arabia rather than Afghanistan and Iraq – since that’s where the money and airline hijackers came from. Our incursions have created more terrorists than have been killed.

The computer WOPR (War Operation Plan Response) in the movie “War Games” ultimately called off a thermo-nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia after being frustrated by its inability to win at tic-tack-toe. As it concluded, “the only winning move is not to play.” We have not been as wise as that computer.

The answer? It can fit on a bumper sticker: “Whatever is the question, war is not the answer.”
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Nicholas Johnson, a native of Iowa City and former FCC commissioner, maintains http://nicholasjohnson.org and http://FromDC2Iowa.blogspot.com. Contact: mailbox@nicholasjohnson.org

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Why Unwinnable 'Wars' Are 'Stupid Stuff'

September 23, 2014, 11:50 a.m.

Note: Click here for an updated list of prior columns and blog essays about terrorism and war.

Add 'Impossible to Win' to Objections to War With ISIS

"A strange game.
The only winning move is not to play."

-- Computer's conclusion about the war game "global nuclear war," from movie "War Games" (1983)

"You can't win, you can't break even
And you can't get out of the game
People keep sayin' things are gonna change
But they look to us like, you're stayin' the same . . .
You can't win, you can't win no way
If your story stays the same, no, no"

-- Charles Emanuel Smalls/Michael Jackson, "You Can't Win"

"We're waist deep in the Big Muddy!
And the big fool says to push on!"

-- Pete Seeger, "Waist Deep in the Big Muddy"

"Don't do stupid stuff."

-- "The polite-company version of a phrase [President Obama's aides] use to describe the president's foreign policy." Los Angeles Times, April 29, 2014.

"After six weeks of American airstrikes, the Iraqi government’s forces have scarcely budged the Sunni extremists of the Islamic State [which] is still dealing humiliating blows to the Iraqi Army."

David D. Kirkpatrick and Omar Al-Jawoshy, "Weeks of U.S. Strikes Fail to Dislodge ISIS in Iraq," New York Times, September 23, 2014, p. A12

"The United States and five Arab allies launched a wide-ranging air campaign against the Islamic State and at least one other extremist group in Syria for the first time early Tuesday . . .."

-- Ben Hubbard and Alan Cowell, "U.S. and Allies Strike ISIS Targets in Syria," New York Times (online), September 23, 2014

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There is a rather long list of categories of reasons why our third military adventure in Iraq is a bad idea. They are very briefly reviewed, below.

But for those for whom none of those categories seem persuasive, we now have another: A "war" with ISIS, in which the U.S. is a leading force, can be neither fought nor "won" by the standards of any reasonable definition of those words.

This is not the same as saying America is no longer the preeminent military force in the world, more advanced in technology and larger in resources than the next 10 countries combined. It still is. It is not to say that our military is less able and macho than the ISIS fighters. It is not. It is only to say that there are some places and times in which we cannot fight and win anything resembling a war. Whatever it is we want from others, whatever our "national security" may require, they must sometimes be achieved with methods and strategies other than military -- not just in addition to military but instead of military.

As I once put it to President Lyndon Johnson, "You can't play basketball on a football field." In that instance, Viet Nam was a country in which we would, inevitably, be viewed as only the latest in a centuries-long history of foreign invaders, entering into a form of civil war, in a country with an unfamiliar language, history, mythology, religion, social structure, and geography, where our "enemies" refused to wear uniforms and thus were indistinguishable from our allies, there was no World War II-like "frontline," and land was won, lost and won again with ever-increasing American (and Vietnamese) deaths.

In that war effort, a high administration official and I came up with a couple of alternatives, only half in jest. We calculated a cost of $500,000 for each Viet Cong killed in our effort to "win hearts and minds." What if we were to simply give every Vietnamese $250,000? They would consider it a fortune; it would cut our costs in half; and would probably win more "hearts and minds" than killing them. The other possibility was to withdraw our soldiers and replace them with realtors, whose mission would be to simply buy up the entire country one hectare at a time.

Neither of our proposed options proved to be popular with the President, who decided about that time that rather than continuing my responsibility for sea lift to Viet Nam, I would make a really terrific FCC commissioner.

If you can't play basketball on a football field, you certainly can't play basketball in the desert sand. The ineffectiveness, indeed the negative contribution, of our military efforts in the Middle East have much in common with our failures in Viet Nam.

Others have cited a range of categories of concerns about our Middle East military adventures -- as have I in "Is U.S. Response Strengthening ISIS? Playing Into the Terrorists' Hands," September 19, 2014; " Why Iowans Should Care About Iraq War III; Why Do We Accept Words Like 'Islam,' 'State,' and 'Caliphate'?" September 16, 2014; and "Is War the Best Answer?" Iowa City Press-Citizen, September 12, 2014, p. A7; embedded in " Whatever the Question, Is War the Best Answer?" September 10, 2014. [The next day, September 24, the New York Times' editorial board outlined some of these categories as applied to Syria in Editorial, "Wrong Turn on Syria: No Convincing Plan," New York Times, September 24, 2014, p. A30.]

Some find our war effort unjustified by their standards, citing rules of war grounded in international law, religion, philosophy, morality and ethics. Others believe the military action is unauthorized under the letter and spirit of our Constitution and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. Frightening the American people into supporting the war on grounds we are under threat of imminent terrorist attack in the U.S. is challenged as, at minimum, unwarranted (e.g., Senator Lindsay Graham, "This president needs to rise to the occasion before we all get killed here at home.") Our military actions are self-defeating insofar as they increase, rather than decrease, (a) the ability of ISIS to recruit additional terrorists from now some 74 countries, and (b) the likelihood of terrorist attacks within the United States. The list goes on and on, including in the three prior blog essays linked just above.

Tom Tomorrow, in his usually incisive way, illustrates some of the folly in our Iraq adventure in this week's "cartoon":

[Source: Tom Tomorrow, "Building Blocks of War," September 22, 2014, Tom Tomorrow, "This Modern World".]

There is a kind of disquieting irony in the last three quotations at the head of this blog essay: President Obama's pledge not to do "stupid stuff," followed by the Times report that our numerous air strikes over Iraq, coupled with the Iraqi military's ineffectiveness, have failed to restrict ISIS' hold on Iraq land; and then the news 24 hours later that the bombing strategy that failed in Iraq has now been extended to Syria. (And of course fighting a "war" against ISIS in Syria -- ISIS being the Syrian government's most effective enemy -- is infinitely more complex and futile than fighting them in Iraq.)

As the other opening quotations illustrate in a variety of contexts, there are some wars, as well as some games, that cannot be "won" -- the computer's conclusion from its analysis of nuclear war that "the only winning move is not to play;" the metaphor of a card game in which the players "can't win, break even, or get out of the game;" and Pete Seeger's image of a war in which we "push on," notwithstanding the fact it is getting progressively worse.

We are not winning our military action against ISIS. There is little prospect that we ever will. Even if we did, as with our "defeat" of al-Qaeda, the likelihood is that another, successor organization will only pop up as ISIS did in this ongoing game of "whack-a-mole." If we ever were to, for the third time, "declare victory and go home" ("Mission Accomplished"), the probability is overwhelming that the results will be similar if not identical to what happened the two prior times.

The "solution"? There is none. There is only the "least worst alternative." We shouldn't have attempted a military action that was not fully supported by our Joint Chiefs of Staff and doomed to failure in the first place. Any option that has "the Great Satan" (the U.S.) as the leading aggressor is highly unlikely to be successful. Perhaps we should slowly abandon overt, conventional military action, limiting our involvement to diplomacy, intelligence gathering, economic and trade sanctions, and trying to restrict ISIS' access to financial resources. I don't pretend to have "the solution."

My only position for now is that "unwinnable wars are stupid stuff."

Now here is a 4:05-minute video excerpt from the 1983 movie "War Games," in which the computer's conclusion is portrayed about 3:50 into the excerpt:



# # #

Why Iowans Should Care About Iraq War III

September 16, 2014, 4:30 p.m.

Note: Click here for an updated list of prior columns and blog essays about terrorism and war.

Why Do We Accept Words Like "Islam," "State," and "Caliphate"?

To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance. For the same human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power -- or risk abusing it. And that’s why . . . clear guidelines, oversight and accountability [are] now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance that I signed yesterday.

In the Afghan war theater, we . . . will continue to take strikes against high value al Qaeda targets, but . . . the progress we’ve made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.

Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces. . . .

America . . . take[s] strikes . . . against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people . . .. [emphasis supplied]

-- President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President at the National Defense University," Fort McNair Washington, D.C., May 23, 2013

"[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 . . ..” [emphasis supplied]

-- "Authorization for Use of Military Force," September 14, 2001 ((Pub. L. 107-40, codified at 115 Stat. 224).

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On September 12 I embedded a column in a blog essay titled, ""Whatever Is the Question, Is War the Best Answer?" -- with links to 10 prior, related blog essays. (Nicholas Johnson, "Is War the Best Answer?" Iowa City Press-Citizen, September 12, 2014, p. A7). That column pointed out that the intelligence community seems to have concluded there is presently little to no likelihood of what the White House calls ISIL conducting terrorist activity inside the United States, and it posed the questions, "Why is Iraq War III in our nation's best interests, and if so, what is our goal, our objective, and 'How would we know if we'd ever been successful?'"

But 600 words is not enough to pursue all the related issues, let alone keep up with unfolding events in this adventure. So there may well be even more blog essays to come over time. Here is today's.

It is personally disappointing that there is not more citizen debate on this war -- including within Iowa. There are many ways in which it impacts Iowans. Iowans are sent to war; some never return, some suffer physical and psychological damage that can last a lifetime, too many reduce their life span through suicide. Families are disrupted, with stress sometimes leading to divorce. Fighting wars on a credit card instead of a pay-as-you-go war tax means there is the financial opportunity cost of war -- the trillions already spent, and billions that continue to be spent, are funds that are unavailable for our roads and bridges, schools and libraries, clean water and flood control, early childhood education, financial support for ethanol production and wind energy, mental health and drug programs as an alternative to our use of prisons.

There is considerable evidence, and opinion within the intelligence community, that what we are doing in Iraq as I write this is increasing rather than decreasing the number of Iraq's terrorists both in Iraq and Syria and the likelihood that their anger at America will bring them to our shores.

A Rose By Any Other Name; Whom Are We Fighting in Iraq, and How Does That Affect the President's Authority? Does Our Current Military Strategy Make Even Military Sense?

Naming Rights

Names make a difference. As general semanticist Wendell Johnson once wrote,

A rose with onion for its name
Might never, never smell the same --
And canny is the nose that knows
An onion that is called a rose.

Why on earth would we want to go along with the words the new gang in Iraq want to use to describe themselves: "Islamic State," "caliphate," "ISIS," or "ISIL"? Those words are their efforts at a branding designed to increase their worldwide appeal to potential terrorists, and otherwise increase their status. Our relentless use of their words only increases their power, appeal, and potential threat to us.

They are not a "state" by any definition of the word. They are not recognized as such by the international community, they do not have the organization of a state, and they do not provide the services of a state. It's hard to justify calling something a duck that can neither quack, walk, nor swim like a duck.

Nor are they Islamic. Catholics associated with Catholic Charities are affiliated with the Catholic Church. Catholics associated with the Mafia are not. Alexander Stille, "The Pope Excommunicates the Mafia, Finally," The New Yorker, June 24, 2014. Muslims are entitled to the same distinctions.

Nor are they a branch of al-Qaeda, a distinction with serious consequences for the President's authority to go to war in Iraq -- for reasons explained immediately below. They can be thought of most accurately, and most favorably to our cause, as Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria (QSIS).

Affiliation of QSIS with al Qaeda

Congress can certainly authorize the President's war in Iraq if it chooses. But it has not yet done so. The White House may be able to find authorization elsewhere; but I'm not convinced by its arguments so far. In any event, it is extraordinarily difficult to make the case that a war against QSIS is legal under the authority granted the President by the AUMF of 2001 (quoted above). It limits his power to fighting "those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001."

There are a number of problems with relying on this document. Given its language and date (2001) it certainly does not appear to be focused on today's challenges in Iraq. Beyond that, for starters, those persons who “planned” or “committed” the 2001 attacks are, for the most part either dead or captured. It is even a stretch to use it as justification for continued pursuit of today's terrorists we consider “members of al-Qaeda.” It is a bigger stretch to say it authorizes using drones to attack “affiliates” of al-Qaeda in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and elsewhere. But there is seemingly no justification whatsoever for using it as authority for conducting war against an al-Qaeda separatist that is actually fighting al-Qaeda.

Congress may or may not want to provide the President an AUMF for what he has announced he is doing in Iraq. But if they do, whatever form that authorization may take, the one Congress approved on September 14, 2001 is not it.

The repudiation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria came after the failure of repeated efforts by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to heal a dispute between ISIS and the officially anointed al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra that has erupted in fighting in parts of rebel-held northern Syria.

ISIS 'is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group . . . does not have an organizational relationship with it and [al-Qaeda] is not the group responsible for their actions,' al-Qaeda’s General Command said in a statement . . .. A U.S. counterterrorism official . . . said Zawahiri had been left with 'little choice but to announce a rupture that, for all intents and purposes, had already taken place.' But despite the weight the al-Qaeda brand still carries among jihadists worldwide, the official said, ISIS 'has never been dependent on AQ core for resources or direction, so the tangible impact of the decision may not be that significant.'”

Liz Sly, "Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq," Washington Post, February 3, 2014.

Mission Creep

Nor is the President's legal position helped by Monday's [Sept. 15] action: "The new campaign included a strike on Monday southwest of Baghdad . . .. The strikes, the Pentagon said, go beyond the United States’ initial mission announced last month of 'protecting our own people and humanitarian missions.'” Steve Kenny, "U.S. Airstrikes Hit Targets Near Baghdad Held by ISIS," New York Times, September 16, 2014, p. A11.

This is not the only evidence of what is more like "mission run" than "mission creep." Assume for a moment that, contrary to the last blog essay, war is the best answer. ["Whatever Is the Question, Is War the Best Answer?" Sept. 10.]

Does Iraq War III Make Military Sense?

"Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress on Tuesday that he would recommend deploying United States combat forces against Islamic extremists in specific operations if the current strategy of airstrikes was not successful, raising the possibility of the kind of escalation that President Obama has flatly ruled out. . . . [As] General Dempsey made it clear, [when] trying to dislodge militants from urban areas like Mosul, airstrikes are less effective because they can cause civilian casualties." Jeremy W. Peters and Mark Landler, "U.S. General to Seek Combat Troops if Airstrikes Can’t Stop ISIS," New York Times, Online September 16, 2014.

“Truly there is no military solution to ISIL,” he said, adding that it could be defeated only with a more comprehensive approach that includes diplomacy. “That may be a tough pill to swallow. But there is no military solution.” Ibid.

Even if there were a military solution, the current military approach -- airstrikes along with only marginal success at putting together a "coalition of the willing" Arab states -- is a long way from the element in the Powell Doctrine that calls for overwhelming force. ("Powell (and other military officers of his generation) believed that the United States should . . . use sufficient force to achieve decisive victory" -- and that only after his eight prior conditions were clearly met. Stephen M. Walt, "Applying the 8 Questions of the Powell Doctrine to Syria," Foreign Policy, September 3, 2013.) [General Colin Powell; photo credit: unknown.]

At the Dempsey hearing, Senator John McCain, not surprisingly, found the military response so far to be "inadequate." Senator Angus King said that airstrikes here and there from time to time struck him as something more resembling a game of "whack-a-mole" than a well-considered military strategy. Peters and Landler, above.

[As will develop over the days to come, and will ultimately be discussed in this blog, there are at least a couple of additional rather significant military obstacles to overcome. (a) Anti-aircraft defenses. Both QSIS and Syria have anti-aircraft capability. There are reports that either QSIS or the Syrian government shot down a plane over Syria just this week. So what? So (1) our bombing efforts cannot be as effective as we thought, (2) more significant, our air war is now, unambiguously, "combat," (3) manned fighter planes are not unmanned drones; there is now a real risk that U.S. pilots can be killed, and (4) if they aren't killed, but are shot down, or otherwise forced to land, General Dempsey has made clear that he will put "boots on the ground" to attempt their rescue. (b) Syria. It is even less clear now than it was a year ago how we can effectively participate in Syria -- with or without combat forces on the ground. Our presumed purpose in entering Syria in any way at this time is to "destroy" QSIS. In addition to the problems always associated with air bombardments in urban wars, and the likelihood of our planes being shot down, we will be fighting (with a goal of destroying) the Syrian government's most effective enemy at this time: QSIS. It is unlikely that we can train enough "moderate" resistance fighters to overwhelm QSIS, and even less likely that all the arms we would supply them would never be taken and used by QSIS forces. And if we were to be "successful" in this effort, which is unlikely, we would have simply aided the Syrian government in oppressing its people further. Thus, our participation in a war in Syria seems even more problematical than our participation in Iraq War III.]

It is, of course, too early to tell how Iraq War III will end -- indeed, whether it ever will. But it is not too early to predict, to sound a warning, and to hope that reason will ultimately prevail.

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Whatever the Question, Is War the Best Answer?

September 10, 2014, 10:30 p.m.

NOTE: There will undoubtedly be updates regarding our Iraq adventure from time to tome. Click here for an updated list of prior columns and blog essays about terrorism and war.

The column, below, was composed and submitted immediately following the President's speech Wednesday evening, September 10, and published today, September 12. It reflects my immediate, personal reactions following that speech. During the 48 hours or more since, it has been both heartening and frightening to see how many individuals who know much more about international law, foreign affairs, policy analysis, and military strategy than I seem to hold similar views.

I had analogous concerns in 2003 and expressed them in the form of "Ten Questions for Bush Before War," a column in the local college paper, The Daily Iowan, February 4, 2003, p. A6. As the years passed, most of those concerns proved to have been valid.

Thereafter I wondered, as I do today about our 2014 Iraq adventure, if my instincts and intuition and limited knowledge are driving me to these concerns, concerns that seem to be shared by others more qualified, why, oh why, are we continuing to pursue such ill-fated approaches? I mean that seriously; what is it that causes our government's disconnect between what seems to be rather widely shared rational analyses by those of independent mind and the policies the government pursues in our name? That, of course, is a column for some future day.

Meanwhile, here is my Wednesday evening effort to understand our most current pursuit of folly, along with today's Press-Citizen editorial on the subject, and links to some prior writing of mine on this and related subjects.

Is War the Best Answer?
Nicholas Johnson
Iowa City Press-Citizen
September 12, 2014, p. A7

We must anticipate and be prepared for the unintended consequences of our action. . . . As we weigh our options, we should be able to conclude with some confidence that the use of force will move us toward the intended outcome.

-- General Martin Dempsey, Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 19, 2013

With his speech Wednesday evening, once again an American President is preparing the people for a rush to war in Iraq –- adding Syria to our expanding battlefield. [Photo credit: The Guardian/AP.]

Once again, our oil has found its way under someone else’s land.

Once again, we must turn to our military leaders for the caution and rational analysis borne of their experience in battle and their study of history.

Now I’m not saying the pre-election threat to America from ISIS in President Obama’s scenario is no more serious today than the pre-election threat to America from Albania was in the movie “Wag the Dog.” Those ISIS folks seem a truly brutal lot.

But the intelligence community is much less alarmist than the politicians and pundits. As Matthew G. Olsen, National Counterterrorism Center director, put it last week, “ISIL is not Al Qaeda pre-9/11.” Homeland Security Secretary Jeh C. Johnson agrees: “We know of no credible information that ISIL is planning to attack the homeland at present.”

Moreover, the President’s strategy carries high risk of creating the very threat that does not now exist. Andrew Liepman, former National Counterterrorism Center deputy director says, “It’s pretty clear that upping our involvement in Iraq and Syria makes it more likely that we will be targeted by the people we are attacking.”

Put aside for the moment any moral questions about the inevitable deaths of thousands of civilians. Put aside legal questions about the President’s authority to wage this war, and international law restraints on “pre-emptive war.” Put aside the likelihood that our intervention will increase, rather than decrease, ISIS’ recruitment of terrorists and risk of harm to our homeland. Put aside the multi-trillion-dollar cost for our grandchildren of these Mideast adventures.

What is our goal? The President says it is to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS. What if the Iraqi Army is not up to that task? What’s “Plan B”? Do we go home, or send in American troops? Are we better off once we’ve destroyed the Syrian government’s toughest enemy?

Have we “destroyed” al Qaeda or just moved it off the front page? Assume we destroyed al Qaeda. How did that work out for us? We got ISIS. Do we really think if we could destroy ISIS nothing would replace it?

What’s our exit strategy? Once we “win,” how do we get out, and what happens when we do? Even if we could eliminate today’s chaos, tribalism, ethnic and religious conflict, why will it not return?

The most fundamental question that’s seldom if ever stated, let alone addressed or resolved is, “What is our ultimate goal, our purpose, for this air war in Iraq and Syria?” As I used to put it to my school board colleagues, "How would we know if we'd ever been successful?” Hopefully, our purpose is not limited to executing our “strategy” for winning battles and wars and then come home, leaving the survivors to fend for themselves.

Will we clean up after the party, reconstructing what war destroys? For how long? With how many billions of taxpayers’ dollars? Is nation-building still a part of our Mideast mission?

Even though we’re rightfully enraged over the beheadings, and want to “do something,” unthinking, precipitous action is not always the most effective revenge.
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Nicholas Johnson, former Administrator, U.S. Maritime Administration, was responsible for sealift to Vietnam, and maintains www.nicholasjohnson.org and FromDC2Iowa.blogspot.com.
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Samples of Nicholas Johnson's Prior Writing on Terrorism and War
"Why Unwinnable 'Wars' Are 'Stupid Stuff;' Add 'Impossible to Win' to Objections to War With ISIS," September 23, 2014;

"Is U.S. Response Strengthening ISIS? Playing Into the Terrorists' Hands," September 19, 2014;

" Why Iowans Should Care About Iraq War III; Why Do We Accept Words Like 'Islam,' 'State,' and 'Caliphate'?" September 16, 2014;

"Is War the Best Answer?" Iowa City Press-Citizen, September 12, 2014, p. A7; embedded in " Whatever the Question, Is War the Best Answer?" September 10, 2014;

"Syria: Moral Imperatives and Rational Analyses; Spotting the Issues," September 4, 2013;

"Thinking About War -- Before Starting One," March 20, 2013;

"General Semantics, Terrorism and War," Fordham University, New York City, September 8, 2006;

"War in Iraq: The Military Objections," International Law Talks: War With Iraq, University of Iowa College of Law, February 27, 2003;

"Ten Questions for Bush Before War," The Daily Iowan, February 4, 2003, p. A6;

Nicholas Johnson, "Capitalists Can Help U.S. Avert War with Iraq," Iowa City Press-Citizen, Sunday Insight, October 6, 2002, p. A11;

Nicholas Johnson, "On Iraq, Tell the Rest of the Story," Iowa City Gazette, October 2, 2002, p. A4;

Nicholas Johnson, "Let's not get between Iraq and a hard place," Omaha World-Herald, August 13, 2002 (and as published in the Iowa City Press-Citizen and as submitted to both);

Nicholas Johnson, "Search for Better Response Than War; Don't Reward the Terrorists, but Understand Their Interests," Des Moines Sunday Register Opinion/Iowa View, June 30, 2002, p. OP3;

Nicholas Johnson, "Rethinking Terrorism," National Lawyers Guild Conference, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, March 2, 2002.
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"Learn the Right Lessons From the 'War on Terror'"
Editorial Board
Iowa City Press-Citizen
September 12, 2014, p. A7
Has it really been fewer than 18 months since President Obama said it was time for the U.S. to stop thinking about future conflicts in terms of “a boundless ‘global war on terror’ ”?

Speaking in May 2013 — more than a decade after Congress first approved the Authorization to Use Military Force in the wake of the 9/11 attacks — the president suggested that the nation, instead, should start viewing such military ventures as “a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks with other countries.”

The phrasing was meant to refocus the county’s attention toward the supposed endings of such military efforts. It was supposed to stop conjuring up the specter of a never-ending conflict that will continue to require the erosion of civil liberties and governmental checks and balances.

“Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue,” Obama said at the time. “But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our democracy demands.”

During his national address Wednesday night, however, the president again raised the specter of an open-ended, military involvement against a terrorist organization that calls itself the “Islamic State” (aka ISIS, aka ISIL) and is scattered throughout the Middle East.

Speaking on the eve of the 13th anniversary of the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, Obama at times sounded like a saber-rattler. (“We will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are. … If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.) And at other times, he risked sounding more like a stand-up comedian. (“Now let’s make two things clear: ISIL is not Islamic. … And ISIL is certainly not a state.”)

But the president did manage to outline a clear, four-step response to the long-term threat posed the Islamic State:

• 1: The U.S. will conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against the terrorist group.

• 2: The U.S. will increase its support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground — whether in Iraq or Syria.

• 3: The U.S. will continue to draw on its “substantial counterterrorism capabilities” to prevent future attacks.

• 4: The U.S. will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to “innocent civilians who’ve been displaced by this terrorist organization.”

The president was equally clear that “this is not our fight alone” and that the American military would be playing more of an advisory role — with regional allies being the ones with boots on the ground.

Yet president didn’t address some of the basic questions — like, “What’s our end point?” — that should be answered before the U.S. commits to any “series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks with other countries.”

That’s why lawmakers, when responding to the president’s speech, couldn’t really criticize the tone and resolve. Yet they nearly all said they were waiting for more details to flesh out Obama’s broad strokes.

We’d like to believe Obama is moving past the failed policies of the “war on terror” approach. Yet the president also did raise the specter of Americans (and American intelligence) needing to keep a suspicious eye on allies and fellow citizens.

“We can’t erase every trace of evil from the world,” Obama said, “and small groups of killers have the capacity to do great harm. … And that’s why we must remain vigilant as threats emerge.”

We’ve seen before how a seemingly never-ending, war-time agenda provides presidents with far too much unchecked authority. How it encourages further mission/linguistic drift and allows phrases like “immediate threat” to come to mean something more along the lines of a threat to someone, somewhere, sometime in the unknown future.

So in their vigilance, the American people also need to make sure that their leaders show they are learning the right lessons from the nation’s past foreign policy mistakes.

# # #

Syria: Moral Imperatives and Rational Analyses

September 4, 2013, 9:15 a.m.
Spotting the Issues

"The fundamental shift in the character of war is illustrated by a stark statistic: in World War I, [for every] nine soldiers [killed there was one] civilian life lost. In today’s wars, [for every nine soldiers killed in battle] it is estimated that [90] civilians die . . .."

-- Greenberg Research, Inc., The People on War Report, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999, p. iii; from "Civilian Casualty Ratio," Wikipedia.org.

"My brother need not be idealized, or enlarged in death beyond what he was in life; to be remembered simply as a good and decent man, who saw wrong and tried to right it, saw suffering and tried to heal it, saw war and tried to stop it."

-- Edward M. Kennedy, "Address at the Public Memorial Service for Robert F. Kennedy," June 8, 1968, American Rhetoric Top 100 Speeches.

[Chart credit: Wikipedia Commons, "Casualties of the Syrian Civil War", Wikipedia.org.]

We are genetically programmed to be physically and emotionally moved by suffering. "I feel your pain" is more than politicians' casual rhetoric. Animal rights activists are not the only ones among us with empathy for suffering animals, whether a beached whale or dolphin in the wild, or a pet cat or dog in our home. Especially is this so when it is humans who are hurting. We feel a special outrage when children are unnecessarily suffering from disease or starvation, and worst of all when they are the victims of deliberate, senseless and inhumane infliction of violence by adults. Photos move us more than text, videos more than still photos, and personal witness most of all. [Photo credit: multiple sources.]

Moreover, when there is the possibility that we might be able to do something to alleviate the suffering of others, there is at least a part of what Ted Kennedy saw in his brother Robert in all of us. We come together to try to right wrong, heal suffering, and stop war.

Indeed, many would say we have a moral, religious, or philosophical obligation to do so -- sometimes with the possibility of great harm to ourselves. That's why a swimmer may dive into a river to save a drowning stranger, or quickly remove someone from an onrushing car or train, or burning building. It is also a part of what motivates the vicarious helping, in the form of charitable giving by individual Americans -- for 2011, two-thirds of the roughly $300 billion total contributions, 12% of which went to human services, with a 15% two-year increase in giving to international affairs organizations. "Charitable Giving Statistics," National Philanthropic Trust (which see for additional data).

And so it is with our feelings for the people of Syria.

We spend more on defense than the next ten countries combined. If it was possible for us to use that overwhelming military might to heal the Syrian people's suffering, and stop their war, I for one think we would have a moral obligation to do so -- however unpopular that view may be in some quarters. There are already 90,000 dead, and two million refugees from this war. We may not have the responsibility, or resources, to be "the world's police force." But I do think, when it is within our power to prevent the killing of tens of thousands more, we have a moral obligation to do so, given that we still remain the world's most powerful nation at this time in history.

The problem on this occasion, as with so many in the past and future to come, is that saving their lives is not within our power. Indeed, it is highly likely that our intervention, whether with a single missile strike or a prolonged bombardment, would increase rather than decrease the suffering and death of the Syrian people.

Of course there are many other issues surrounding President Obama's desire to send missiles to Syria. I may later itemize some of them below. Although there is a case to be made, and that the Administration has attempted to make, for this action, I do believe that any rational benefit-cost analysis finds that case decisively outweighed by the likelihood of its doing more harm than good, with risks and costs orders of magnitude greater than any possible benefits.

But that will have to wait for later. This blog essay is deliberately narrowly focused on the moral issue.

There may be, and often are, cases in which the moral obligation to prevent human death and suffering is politically, or emotionally, overridden by other considerations -- such as the Allies decision to fight World War II. As a result of that decision, some 38 to 55 million innocent civilians were killed, many of whom might have lived had Hitler been left free to take over all of Europe and more. I do not believe a civil war within a single country, at least not today's Syria -- one that has neither attacked us, nor shown present intention and ability to occupy surrounding countries, Nazi style -- is such a case.

My conclusion: If it were possible for us to stop the Syrian civil war, prevent the deaths of thousands more, and the continued suffering of hundreds of thousands more refugees and others, I think we would have a moral obligation to do so. When that is not possible, as I believe to be the case, especially given the additional harm that would probably result from our intervention, the same rationale and analysis leads me to the conclusion that we have a moral obligation to stay out.

[More on other issues, below.]

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The Other Issues
Let's put aside the moral issues for the moment, however you came out on those, and look at some of the other troublesome aspects of this venture.

A Rational Analysis of the Military Option.

One way into war, seemingly popular with some elected officials, is shouting slogans like "USA! USA!" or "Nuke 'em!" or "Let's kick some butt!" or "These colors don't run!" While energizing and possibly emotionally satisfying, it lacks something as a precise analysis.

An alternative is an approach I used in a column prior to the Iraq War: Nicholas Johnson, "Ten Questions for Bush Before War," The Daily Iowan, February 4, 2003, p. A6. Not all of those ten questions are specifically applicable to sending missiles to Syria, of course, but the approach is similar.

1. What is our goal, our purpose, in intervening in Syria? As I used to put it to my school board colleagues, "How would we know if we'd ever been successful?" Our purpose seems to have included, at various times, regime change, humanitarian aid for the innocent suffering Syrians, providing weapons to the insurgents, creating a no-fly zone to protect Syrians from aerial attack, punishing the leadership for gassing its citizens while warning other nations never to do it, and most recently, knocking out the government's command and control facilities -- as the Senate puts it, "shifting the momentum on the battlefield," over a period of 60 days with a 30-day extension.

It's hard to critique a proposed attack of some kind on Syria without knowing the nature of that attack, the purpose it's designed to serve, and how long it's gong to last.

2. Whatever the answers to those questions may be, once those answers are obtained the next question is, "Why do we think the military exercise we've envisioned will produce the result we desire?" Are there alternative approaches that might be more effective, cheaper, and less likely to have negative consequences -- diplomacy, economic sanctions, charging Assad with war crimes in the International Criminal Court?

3. After our attack, will the people of Syria be better or worse off than they were before we took whatever action we end up taking? In particular, to the extent our goal is regime change, what is the likelihood that the new, replacement regime will be better for the Syrian people -- and us? Indeed, given all the disparate groups jockeying for dominant control, and likely to continue fighting if and when Assad is ever replaced, what are the odds of any "regime" emerging?

4. Do the American people, and their elected representatives, support this military action, and if they do now, how long can that support be sustained? Do the people of Syria? Does the Obama Administration have the support of the United Nations, NATO, the Arab League? It would appear not. The British House of Commons voted to stay out. Polls indicate most Americans are opposed, and the House of Representatives is unlikely to authorize the President's new "war." The Russian and Chinese veto pretty much prevents any United Nations action. The "Arab street" seems at best split over the desirability of "Western intervention."

5. The total costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, including lifetime support of those who've served, looks something like $2-3 trillion. What are the economic and political consequences of adding to that debt?

6. Once we have identified our goal, and if it involves the betterment of the Syrian people, and if we are successful in achieving it, what will be required to secure and maintain those gains? How long will we need to be involved in some way, even if it does not involve American military personnel inside Syria? It's not clear whether the promise to not put any "boots on the ground" only refers to "combat troops," or really means we will keep all American CIA and military personnel out of Syria.

7. And finally we come to "exit strategy." How do we get out? What happens when we do? Why will our gains, our achievement of our goal (if it was ever precisely identified and ultimately reached), be maintained after we are no longer there?

Inconsistencies and Other Troubling Features of the Operation

8. Why now? Put aside the chemical attacks for the moment. Syria's President Bashar al-Assad has killed 90,000 of his people the old fashioned way. If a part of our motivation is to protect the Syrian people from their government, why did those deaths not move the Administration to action months ago? Why not wait for the report of the UN investigators regarding the cause of death, and whatever evidence can be found regarding who was responsible for it?

9. Now let's address the chemical warfare. I get it; that's a violation of international law. Conventional weapons are usually legal under international law. Personally, I find killing your own people, innocent civilians, to be pretty disgusting regardless of the means used. But even if the only thing that moves you to action is the use of chemical weapons, why was that not a concern the 14 prior times he used them? Why were we so totally unconcerned when Saddam Hussein used them on his Kurds and the Iranians, and suddenly concerned enough to go to war now? Why do we think it's OK for us to possess them?

10. What's with this "red line" of Obama's? If he's going to throw down challenges, doesn't he realize he needs to be prepared to act, and quickly, when Assad crosses his line? Why didn't he act the first time Assad used chemical weapons once the red line was drawn? How much of the "urgency of now" with regard to this attack on Syria is driven by the president's personal embarrassment from his new-found awareness that failing to follow up on threats is extraordinarily damaging to our national interests? Isn't this behavior reminiscent of President George W. Bush's complaint that Saddam Hussein "tried to kill my daddy" -- injecting a president's personal involvement, reputation, or embarrassment, into what ought to be depersonalized analysis?

11. Beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not enough for a jury to find a defendant guilty of a routine crime because "he probably did it." They need to find his guilt proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." Based on the photos and video we've seen, the likelihood is that chemical weapons were the cause of the recent death and suffering. But when it comes to finding Assad "guilty," basically all we have is "he probably did it." That may be enough for some responses, like diplomacy, and our intuition is certainly more solidly grounded in this case than when the last president wanted to go to war with Iraq because it was a "slam dunk" that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. But is it enough to go to war?

12. Congress. So the president is asking Congress to sign off on his war. Never hurts to follow the Constitution from time to time. It would be nice if presidents would always do that. (It would also be nice if presidents and Congress would impose extra pay-as-you-go taxes to pay for wars before the wars, rather than putting them on our grand children's credit cards.) But I'm not sure it's accurate or fair to say congressional approval, if it comes, can be fairly said to represent the support of the American people. For starters all but about 10-to-15% of the American people are disgusted with Congress. And roughly two-thirds of Americans (depending on how they are asked the question) oppose going to war with, or lobbing missiles over, Syria.

13. Find a better place for war. The Middle East is probably the worst possible place to start lobbing missiles toward someone. It is as likely to harden Assad's resolve as to weaken it. It will certainly continue to accelerate our very successful program of increasing the number and ferociousness of al-Qaeda recruits -- who may very well be the ones to take over and rule Syria if we were to be successful at "regime change." And there is no credible scenario that I have seen as to why it is not likely to bring in the Russians and Iranians, possibly provoke attacks on Israel, and otherwise spread to other neighbors of Syria. On the assumption our actions don't provoke a World War III, and we just risk attacks on Israel, and further alienation of China and Russia, we next explore what other blowback is possible.

14. Blowback. How have those missile attacks been working out for us in the past? Not so well. (a) In 1983 we shelled military forces engaged in a civil war in Lebanon, in that case in an effort to support the Lebanese army. What was the reaction? A month later suicide bombers blew up our Marine barracks, killing 241 Marines. We brought the survivors home, and the civil war continued until 1990. (b) In 1998 al-Qaeda bombed our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The U.S. answered with missile hits on al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan, and, with erroneous intelligence (that it was a chemical weapons plant), a plant in Sudan producing medicine for the Sudanese people. The blowback? The USS Cole was attacked, and a year later we were dealing with 9/11.

It wasn't long ago we closed numerous embassies, especially in the Middle East and Africa, out of concern they might be attacked. After we lob missiles at Syria is it more, or less, likely that those concerns will prove to have been well-founded? (Apparently, intercepts have already revealed plans to attack the U.S. embassy in Bagdad if we attack Syria.) By what standard can an increased risk of attack on Americans, as we have experienced in the past, be said to improve our national security?

15. "Collaterally damaged" civilians. As the quote at the top of this blog essay reveals, war produces as many as ten times the number of civilian casualties as military. This is not a very effective way to "win hearts and minds."

There's more to be said -- but not by me. This is enough to give you a sense of my thinking on the matter. What's yours? "Not in my name" says little without the backup of some reasoning. American citizens still have some credibility and respect abroad on the part of those in other countries who are willing to say, "It's not the American people, it's their government." However, unless we all speak up, it will be done in our name, and it will be the American people who will be properly faulted, not just our government.

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