Glass Steagall, Happy Valley and The Dark Knight

July 24, 2012, 10:30 a.m.

Institutions, Conflicts of Interest, and Remedies

What do the global economic collapse, the Penn State outrage, and the Aurora, Colorado, massacre have in common?

They all involve institutional structures, behavior, and inherent conflicts of interest that produce predictable horrible consequences.

I. Glass Steagall

Following the Great Depression, it became so obvious as to be beyond denial that it is impossible to "regulate" the abuses that will occur if traditional banks are permitted to also function as "investment banks." The only truly effective prescription was recognized to be prophylactic: prohibit the combination.

The Glass Steagall Act was that prohibition. And it worked.

Until the "deregulation" mantra of the 1980s, and the growing political power of these "casino banks," ultimately led to the repeal of Glass Steagall during President Clinton's administration -- amidst Chicago-school promises and predictions of a "market" governed by "self-regulation."

A decade later we began living through the consequences of that self-regulation, and we've yet to dig ourselves out of the hole it's left in the world's economy.

It was inevitable this would happen. We're talking about an industry that manufactures nothing, and makes its money by buying and selling the symbols of money, and measures its firms' success by their ability to create ever-increasing profits quarter after quarter. The executives' conflicts of interest are in colored neon lights. The pressures to ultimately manipulate the LIBOR rate (with its impact on trillions of dollars of symbols of money), and sell electronic symbols of "assets" candidly named "sub-prime," are irresistible.

Why was Glass Steagall not re-enacted after 2008? Why were even feeble efforts at regulation opposed by many and watered down by all? Why did regulators sit idly by as the same guys who brought us down in 2008 continued the same practices in 2012?

Because the members of the U.S. House and Senate also have a conflict of interest. The American people have never demanded, in an organized and effective way, public financing of campaigns, or even that the most gross practices in political fundraising be reigned in. Institutionally, our political system is awash with cash.

Every morning when the sun comes up, a senator who wishes to be re-elected knows that, by sundown, he or she has to find, somewhere, $10,000 for their next campaign. Let me repeat that. A senator must raise, every day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, $10,000. (See, Nicholas Johnson, "Campaigns: You Pay $4 or $4000," Des Moines Register, July 21, 1996, p. C2.)

If that was your task where would you go? The notorious bank robber, Willie Sutton, said he robbed banks because "that's where the money is." That's where the money still is, and that's where elected officials go.

But there's a price that you and I pay for this system. These campaign contributions (or more accurately, bribes) are not "gifts," they are "investments." (Investments, incidentally, with a pay-back of something between $1000-to-$1 to $2000-to-$1. See, Nicholas Johnson, "Campaigns: You Pay $4 or $4000," Des Moines Register, July 21, 1996, p. C2.) Because if a politician expects to stay in politics, as they say in Texas, "You dance with the one that brung ya'."

This behavior by our elected officials may be greedy or unethical on the part of some. But it is for all a consequence of the institutions we have permitted to be built, and the inherent conflicts of interest they impose on the participants -- as much for elected officials who must beg for millions from special interests as for financial institutions' executives, whose performance is measured in profits and stock prices.

II. Penn State

It's one thing to try to overlook "the elephant in the living room."

But it is really difficult for a university's administration, students, coaches, players, faculty and staff to pretend that they do not see the elephants in the classrooms and lecture halls, student dorms, president's office -- and the herd of elephants trampling the grass on the campus grounds. See "College Football Scandals Larger Lessons."

The conflicts of interest, the pressures, are everywhere. A coach who is told to maintain his athletes' grades knows full well that he or she was hired, may be fired, and will be compensated, on the basis of wins and losses. A non-tenured faculty member is aware that the grade awarded class members who are starting football players may affect the outcome in Saturday's game -- and may fear the impact on their tenure decision. A football player may be forced to a choice between the afternoon lab sessions required for his medical school dreams, and the compulsory practices if he's to stay on the team. University presidents, athletic directors and other administrators, make decisions in an environment in which football is exceedingly important in recruiting students (with their tuition dollars; and possibly even the recruiting of some faculty), maintaining alumni loyalty (and contributions), school spirit locally and reputation nationally -- and, last but certainly not least, millions of dollars in skybox rental, season ticket, TV and bowl game revenue. "UI Held Hostage Day 378 - Feb. 3 - Athletics," and Nicholas Johnson, "Cheaper Than a Rain Forest," Iowa City Press-Citizen, February 3, 2007. And see, "Name Game & Other Moral Dilemmas"; and "Revenue is Needed."

This institutional structure, these conflicts of interest -- like those in the financial industry, and the impact of campaign finance on public policy -- are inevitable, they are built in. That doesn't excuse administrators' failure to act at Penn State -- nor University of Iowa administrators participation in an advertising campaign with a beer company that can't pass the laugh test. (Nicholas Johnson, "A Busch in the Hand is Worth . . .."

The solution? As with Glass Steagall, there are only two paths that I can see. Admittedly, as Robert Frost might have put it, "Higher education came to a fork in football's road -- and took neither." I am not so naive as to think either would ever be followed.

One is represented by the University of Chicago President and Chancellor Robert Maynard Hutchins' decision to simply abolish the school's football program.

Another is one I've written about over the years. Many in the sports business tell me it's a good idea -- but only privately, after insisting I never reveal their names, and acknowledging it will never be done.

In summary: keep "college football," but remove it from the academy. Treat it like the farm club system it is for the NFL. An independent, for-profit corporation would own the teams, pay the players and coaches. Schools could offer an education to players who wanted it, but there would be no "student-athlete" pretense, no requirement players be enrolled. See, e.g., "UI Held Hostage Day 378 - Feb. 3 - Athletics," and Nicholas Johnson, "Cheaper Than a Rain Forest," Iowa City Press-Citizen, February 3, 2007.

III. Guns and Media Violence

By now you've got the idea.

The extent of the NRA's control of elected officials -- like the control exercised by the financial community -- was most dramatically exhibited this week by the two leading candidates for president of the United States. Neither one of them, or any of their campaign staff, even whispered anything that could be interpreted as "gun control."

Other countries look aghast at our gun laws. What explanation can there possibly be for a policy that makes assault rifles, and other military killing equipment, available to ordinary citizens? See, "Guns Do Kill -- 30,000 Americans a Year," and Nicholas Johnson, "A Public Health Response to Handgun Injuries: Prescription -- Communication and Education," American Journal of Preventive Medicine (May/June 1993) ("So long as we are unwilling to adopt effective, fail-safe solutions--actually removing these instruments of carnage from our midst--the price exacted for this "freedom" will continue to be thousands of lives of children and adults.").

There are undoubtedly some elected officials who think this is a really nifty policy. But all are aware that if they do not vote the NRA line they will likely find themselves on the unemployment lines.

Media violence is also in some measure a function of a conflict of interest.

When I was concerned about the subject, as an FCC commissioner and subsequently as chair of the National Citizen Committee for Broadcasting, there were some 3,000 studies documenting the relationship between media violence (TV and film) and violence of various kinds in society.

But the fact is that violence sells. Variety reports "The Dark Knight's" $161 million opening weekend made it the highest grossing 2D film ever. If you were a studio CEO, how much of that would you be willing to sacrifice to get the support of violence critics? Hollywood TV writers used to complain about New York network executives who essentially ordered them to insert violence in shows (where the writers didn't think it was consistent with the story) to maintain ratings -- especially to carry over during the commercials.

Without regulation, the levels of violence (and sexploitation) in TV and film will continue to escalate up to the point at which the audience is (if ever) turned off by it, and revenues decrease rather than increase.

The bottom line: We are all responsible for our own behavior. There is no "excuse" for what happened on Wall Street, at Penn State, or the sale of assault rifles used in Aurora. But if each of us is to have the freedom to be the best that we can be, if we are ever to have a prayer of reducing the unethical behavior throughout our major institutions, we also must examine and reform the institutional structures, incentives and conflicts of interest that encourage the worst in each of us.

# # #

College Football Scandals Larger Lessons

This blog entry is being continuously updated from time to time as events and revelations unfold -- most recently January 27. See, e.g., these direct links to "Thursday Edition Addition," . . . and more additions thereafter, "Subsequent comments of others worth noting". There have also been some modifications and additions to the original blog entry, which follows, immediately below:

November 8, 2011, 8:00 a.m.

Football's Privileged Tip of Abuses by Powerful
It's a sad, sad story coming out of Penn State football and spread across the nation's sports pages. Mark Viera, "Two Penn State Officials Stepping Down," New York Times, November 7, 2011, p. D3. You can read the details there if you want. I have no desire or need to repeat them here, except to identify that they involve alleged sexual abuse of young boys and a grand jury indictment.

[Arrest of Coach Sandusky. Photo credit: Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General] What I want to focus on is what this case reveals, not only about higher education's administrators, but about institutional instincts and crisis management generally. See, e.g., "Crisis Communications 101," February 14, 23, 2011; and the text and links in "Strategic Communications a Failed Strategy," November 13, 2009.

The pattern is all too common. There's a scandal in a collegiate football program, often involving something that can be designated as one form or another of "sexual." Nothing is done until it hits the papers. The initial reaction is some variation of denial, with expressions of support for those responsible. As the trickle of details becomes a flood, like the 100- or 500-year floods Iowa City suffers every 10 years or so, the media continues to poke holes in the levies until the facts spread over the campus can no longer be ignored. Then come the professions of the institution's high ethical and moral standards, an "investigation" is launched, and ultimately the university president and coach are still in place, with raises on top of already more-than-adequate salaries, and a couple of others in the chain of responsibility are thrown under the bus.

Susan Harman has written an insightful column about this phenomenon in this morning's Press-Citizen describing cases at both Ohio State and the current Penn State scandal this year. "Are Big Programs Turning a Blind Eye? Sandusky Charges May Tarnish Image of Paterno, Penn St.," November 8, 2011, p. B1.

Apparently nobody at Penn State did anything about eye witness reports of these crimes -- except for reporting up the chain of command from witnesses, to coach, to athletic director, vice president for finance and business, and on to the Penn State president, Graham Spanier. [Photo credit (left): Iowa City Press-Citizen.] Allegedly, the president did not report this to law enforcement (as the law requires), say anything to his Board of Trustees, insist on firing the alleged perpetrator, or follow-up to see if the offenses continued.

What he did have to say, after the two in the middle were indicted by the grand jury for perjury, was that he predicted they both would be exonerated and that "I have known and worked daily with Tim and Gary for more than 16 years. I have complete confidence in how they handled the allegations about a former university employee." As Susan Harman put it, he was "casting aspersions on the grand jury process and the testimony of many witnesses by almost dismissively asserting his administrators' innocence." (Only after a post-media-revelation emergency meeting of the Board of Trustees was the AD put on administrative leave.)

Sometimes in Japan, and elsewhere, following an institutional embarrassment of this magnitude, the person at the top actually kills themselves because of the personal humiliation. In this country, the more common honorable response is to take the responsibility for it -- even when the top administrator has had neither participation or even knowledge of the problem -- and resign.

I would note in this context, a football example of this honorable response. Iowa's Coach Kirk Ferentz, following the embarrassing loss to Minnesota October 29, did not blame the assistant coach most responsible for Iowa's failure to anticipate Minnesota's fateful onside kick, nor did he blame any of his players. He assumed personal responsibility for the decision and 22-21 loss. "'The onside kick, I’ll take that one. Just as soon as [the kicker] started making his approach, I almost called timeout. I’m standing next to an official. I should have in retrospect, but I didn’t.'" Jordan Garretson, "Notebook: Ferentz shoulders blame for Minnesota’s onside kick," Daily Iowan, November 1, 2011.

Clearly, in spite of the multi-million-dollar revenue, the powerful conflicts of interest, the challenges to integrity, the abuses, there are college athletic programs that have not fallen victim to this process.

But my point is not even about what one university president once told me he considered the "anomaly" of big-time football within the academy. It is a point potentially applicable to almost all large institutions that, as Harman puts it, "continually protect the powerful at the expense of the vulnerable."

As she points out, "universities are not so different from banks and Wall Street financial institutions or established churches in the way they wield power and influence."

And before the day is out, we will have heard from a Republican presidential candidate, with a good deal of power behind him, also involved in "sexual" allegations. Jim Rutenberg and Michael D. Shear, "Woman Accuses Cain of Groping; He Denies Charge," New York Times, November 8, 2011, p. Al. Will it also be just yet one more, like DSK and the New York hotel maid, "Dominique's Dominos: Strauss-Kahn and Sexual Assault," July 1, 2011, of protecting "the powerful at the expense of the vulnerable"?

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Thursday Edition Addition

Normally I don't "update" blog entries, even though a significant number of the hits on this blog go to entries four and five years old. It's highly unlikely anyone today, November 10, 2011, is unaware of today's status of this story, but that may not be the case years from now. So here's one of this morning's accounts:

Mark Vera, "Paterno is Finished at Penn State, and President is Out," New York Times, November 10, 2011, p. A1.

Given that I'm assuming the Board essentially "fired" both Coach Paterno and President Spanier, it's not clear to me why the disparate characterization in the headline and story: "Paterno is Finished" but President Spanier is "Out"; "Joe Paterno . . . was fired . . .. Graham B. Spanier . . . was also removed by the Board of Trustees."

Nor is it clear, with Spanier and Paterno having been fired, and both Athletic Director Tim Curley and Vice President for Finance Gary Schultz having been indicted by the grand jury for perjury, why Curley has been permitted to have merely "taken a leave of absence" and Schultz has merely "decided to step down." "Penn State Fires Joe Paterno; Decision Made Wednesday Night," Associated Press/Hawk Central, November 9, 2011.

Questions have also been raised about the retention of assistant coach Mike McQueary: "That McQueary remains on the staff is shocking. Penn State fired legendary coach Joe Paterno and president Graham Spanier on Wednesday for their failure to follow up on a 2002 report . . .. That report came from McQueary, who told a grand jury earlier this year that he saw everything." Andy Staples, "Penn State Making Progress, but Two Personnel Moves Still Remain," "Inside College Football"/Sports Illustrated, November 10, 2011. News the afternoon of the next day was that "Penn State assistant coach Mike McQueary . . . has been placed on administrative leave. . . . [T]he school said McQueary would not be present when the Nittany Lions play Nebraska on Saturday because he has received threats." Genaro C. Armas, "PSU: McQueary Put on Administrative Leave," Associated Press/rivals.com/Yahoo!, November 11, 2011.

The Times' story also quotes Spanier's statement that, "This university is a large and complex institution, and although I have always acted honorably and in the best interest of the university, the buck stops here. In this situation, I believe it is in the best interest of the university to give my successor a clear path to resolve the issues before us.”

To me, that sounds like, "I am totally blameless, always having acted honorably, and am now an innocent casualty. But because I am theoretically responsible for everything that goes on at this large and complex institution, whether I know about it or not, and I have always put the best interests of the university ahead of my own, I am voluntarily resigning."

Now I recognize that, had he said this two days ago when I first wrote this blog entry, he would have been saying precisely what I was advocating he should have said at that time. It's just that, coming after he's fired by his Board, it sounds a little disingenuous.

So where are we with this now?

1. Legally. Most of the official, media, and public concern about this sad mess has focused on (a) the harm done to the young boys, (b) the offenses by defendant and assistant coach Jerry Sandusky, and (c) the moral (as distinguished from legal) obligations of all who knew. But there are remaining legal issues and actions as well -- possibly civil as well as criminal. See, for example, the grand jury indictment linked from the top of this blog entry.

Those issues make for interesting law school faculty luncheon discussions regarding who has a responsibility, under the criminal law of various states, to report what, about whom, when, and to whom. (Indeed, what are your legal (or institutional) reporting obligations when you have something between a strong suspicion and an eye-witness account of a possible crime?) Similar questions arise under the regulations of an individual university regarding reporting requirements.

I'm not going to provide that law-review-article-depth-and-lengthy, footnoted discussion here. Those things will sort themselves out over time, and the outcomes will be reported and available to those who care.

2. Morally. The primary issues here -- and the basis for the firing of a university's president and football coach -- may well be moral and ethical rather than legal. On the hypothetical assumption they both complied with their legal obligations, what more were they morally obliged to do?

The late Senator Ted Kennedy's tribute to his brother, Robert, at a memorial service following Robert's death, included a description of him as "a good and decent man, who saw wrong and tried to right it, saw suffering and tried to heal it, saw war and tried to stop it."

The moral judgment, it seems to me, turns on whether as much will be able to be said of the five adult principals involved in this case when their memorial services are held. Did they know that wrong had been done, that suffering had resulted, and did they then try to stop it?

As Buzz Bissinger put it, "This is not a football scandal of illegal recruiting and payoffs and prostitutes. It is a national scandal involving morality, weakness of character, passing the buck, inaction, cowardice, neglect and what appears to be outright lying. If the allegations are true, head coach Joe Paterno and top-ranking university officials allowed former assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky to roam loose as a sexual predator even though there were clear indications of his abuse of children."

Buzz Bissinger, "This Is Not a Football Scandal," New York Times, November 10, 2011 (arguing that Saturday's Nebraska game, and season, should not be cancelled; from a collection of five comments worth reading that address, "Room for Debate: Should Penn State Cancel Its Season?").

If Sandusky did in fact do what he is charged with having done, I know of no one who would come to his defense. Some might prefer psychiatric treatment along with prison, but none would excuse his actions.

"The five," however, are not charged with such acts. In fact, to the extent they are charged with anything, it is non-action rather than action -- except for the two whom the grand jury has charged with perjury.

Bissinger undoubtedly has access to more information than I have. It certainly appears, based on what I've read in the press, that he is right. But my final, moral judgments of certainty are going to await more documentation of the details of non-action by "the five."

For me, much of the answer to the moral issue turns on the answer to the question another senator, Senator Howard Baker, reiterated during the Senate investigation of President Richard Nixon's involvement in the Watergate break-in: "What did the President know, and when did he know it?" What did Paterno know, and when did he know it? What did Spanier know, and when did he know it? (Coincidentally, today's news also included, Calvin Woodward and Nancy Benac, "Nixon's Long-Secret Watergate Testimony Coming Out," Associated Press/Yahoo!News, November 10, 2011.)

Paterno worked with Sandusky for decades. When did he first hear rumors, have suspicion, or actual knowledge, of Sandusky's child abuse? If he had been provided only vague information, would he have had a legitimate, reasonable basis for believing that Sandusky had been involved in only one ambiguous encounter, received treatment, and been "cured"? Was this something he'd had multiple, detailed reports about over a period of years, or something that he is now as shocked to find out about as anyone? (That lack of awareness can happen, as we occasionally hear in a story of a crime and a neighbor's response: "They were such a nice friendly family; always kept their lawn nicely trimmed; attended church every Sunday. Who would ever have thought they were terrorists building bombs in the garage?")

When the eye witness reported to Paterno, how detailed was that report, what exactly was he told?

Not incidentally, what were the university's regulations and social norms regarding the reporting of crimes and inappropriate behavior? Are administrators and faculty members merely expected to report to superiors (e.g., vice presidents, deans, or department heads)-- which Paterno apparently did by telling the AD? Or are they expected to take matters into their own hands, and make individual independent judgments in each case whether to file a police report, commit a person to a psyc ward or hospital, get them into Alcoholics Anonymous or drug rehab, or whatever else in their judgment is the most appropriate action?

Similar questions need to be asked, and answered, regarding Spanier. What precisely was he told and when? It would seem to me that his moral obligation would vary, depending on whether he was told, almost casually, during the course of a lengthy meeting, "We've got a little personnel problem in athletics with Sandusky, but the AD's taking care of it," or he was provided the shocking details of what had been witnessed.

Finally, I don't think the individual Board members are immune from this line of inquiry. Were each of them totally shocked, never having heard a whisper of the scandal, prior to the days they started holding emergency sessions? Were none of them ever told by Spanier of the problem -- the answer to which reflects on both Spanier (to the extent he knew but didn't tell) and the Board members (to the extent they were fully informed, but never acted before last evening).

If the Board members knew and did nothing, was their ultimate resolution last evening -- the peremptory firing of Spanier and Paterno, without according them a reasonable opportunity to be heard, or other due process protections -- the result of the Board's investigation of and response to the facts, or a knee jerk response to adverse publicity? Had the national media firestorm not billowed out of control might they, too, have continued to let it slide without taking action?

This was a sad story on Tuesday, and an even sadder story on Thursday. It will not quickly go away. While I have no interest in repeating here the rumors that are already beginning to fly, there may be more to be added to this blog entry over the weeks and months to come as additional, documented facts come out.
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Subsequent comments of others worth noting . . .

Jon Stewart's Comedy Central "The Daily Show" offers up a four-times-a-week sharp, satiric commentary on the news that has become for many in its audience their primary source of news. Stewart found nothing funny about the Penn State scandal, but his November 10, 2011, commentary provides his own take on our relative priorities:

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart	Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c
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A University of Chicago graduate student with many ties to State College, Pennsylvania, has itemized, taken on, and scorched the failings of an entire generation, for which PSU's handling of Sandusky's crimes is simply the last straw. Thomas L. Day, "Penn State, My Final Loss of Faith," "On Faith: Guest Voices," Washington Post, November 11, 2011.

The Times Nina Bernstein has endeavored to put the Penn State events into a context of analogous mishandling by other universities. Nina Bernstein, "On Campus, a Law Enforcement System to Itself," New York Times, November 12, 2011, p. A1.

November 15 update: "Close to 10 additional suspected victims have come forward . . .. Sandusky [says] he was innocent of the charges [but] acknowledge[s], 'I shouldn't have showered with those kids.' . . . On Sunday [Nov. 13], Jack Raykovitz, the chief executive of [Second Mile] . . . resigned." Mark Vera and Jo Becker, "Ex-Coach Denies Charges Amid New Accusations," New York Times, November 15, 2011, p. B13.

November 17: For an historical itemization and account of relevant events, see Justin Sablich and Alan McLean, "Timeline: The Penn State Scandal," New York Times, November 11, 2011, and Jo Becker, "Inquiry Grew Into Concerns of a Cover-Up," New York Times, November 17, 2011, p. B11.

November 18: Frank Deford's usually insightful take on an answer to, "what happened and why?"

[T]he consensus . . . is that, first, Joe Paterno didn't want to scar the reputation of himself or his football program; and then, university executives wanted to protect the reputation of the dear old coach and his moneymaking team.

Yet I must wonder, as well, how much the culture of the particular sport involved — football — abetted the conspiracy of silence . . ..

Because of [football's] reputation of machismo — that conceit, that creed — it surely becomes painful, almost traitorous, for men who love football to accept such an abject contradiction of their sport's manliness — the very rape of a little boy by a coach. . . .

Even Paterno himself may not know what caused him to fail such a basic test of decency. But still, I cannot help but wonder that, no, it wasn't primarily because of his own reputation or because of all the money Penn State football made that stopped him from acting. No, I wonder if, above all, Coach Paterno could not bear to see shame come to his beloved game of football.

Frank Deford, "Is Football Culture The Core Of The Problem?" NPR, November 16, 2011.

Deford may have a point, but educational administrators -- university presidents -- are not the only ones among us whose good sense and ethics can be bent, and sometimes broken, with the explanation that "revenue is needed." As I have often said of that rationalization, "once 'revenue is needed' becomes your polestar, your moral compass begins to spin as if on the North Pole." Clearly, Penn State's football program generally, and Joe Paterno specifically, were responsible for millions of dollars of revenue -- not just from football tickets and TV, but from the additional grants and gifts they stimulated for educational programs.

Long before the Penn State scandal broke, the Houston Chronicle's Nick Anderson captured the impact of football's cash on university presidents in another context:

[Credit: Nick Anderson, Houston Chronicle, September 23, 2011.]

November 20: Sandusky's charity, Second Mile, is being investigated regarding what its administrators and board knew, and when they knew it, and what they did about it. Some donors are backing away. Mark Viera, Jo Becker and Pete Thamel, "Charity Founded by Accused Ex-Coach May Fold," New York Times, November 19, 2011, p. D1.

The NCAA, not exactly the first on the scene, is now considering an "investigation" that will not require any investigators in State College and appears to be little more than following the story in the papers and courts. In fairness, its "enforcement," as a private association, has been primarily focused on, and limited to, its own self-imposed rules regarding academic and recruiting integrity, sports betting, the amateur status (limitations on payment) of college athletes, and related matters. Criminal and other offenses that do not affect such matters, the field of play, and fair competition between teams, have been left to the individual universities. That may now change. Pete Thamel, "N.C.A.A. Begins Penn State Inquiry," New York Times, November 19, 2011, p. D3

Assistant Coach Mike McQueary emailed friends that he did intervene when he saw Sandusky sexually assaulting a young boy in the shower, and that he did "discuss" the matter with the "police" (with no designation of "city" or "campus" police). However, both police departments now say they have no record of his contacting them."Police: PSU's McQueary didn't report Sandusky incident to us," Associated Press/Sports Illustrated, November 16, 2011.

November 21: Economists call them "externalities." It's a concept also applicable to criminal offenses. A factory belching pollutants in excess of permitted levels is fined, creating a financial impact on its profits. But there may not be as much public recognition of the impact on asthmatics. An over-leveraged Wall Street investment banker may throw the company into bankruptcy; but his behavior may also result in a foreclosure on a homeowner in Tucson, Arizona.

And so it is that Sandusky's alleged criminal behavior could have been predicted to cause a lifetime of harm to his victims, personal shame for him, risk a decline in ticket sales, and besmirch the formerly enviable ethical record of the Nittany Lions' football program. But the full reach of the fallout can only be guessed at now: a decline in donors' contributions to academic as well as athletic programs? New legislation from the Pennsylvania legislature -- as well as other states and Congress? A decline in students' applications for admission?

Today's revelation involves the impact on sales of clothing and other Penn State-logo items -- so far an unprecedented 40% decline. This is not an insignificant market: sales of $4 billion a year for college athletic programs; $80 million for Penn State, one of the top-10 schools. Joann Loviglio, "Scandal Hurts Penn State as a School and a Brand," Associated Press, November 20, 2011.

November 23: For a moving story about one of the alleged victims, and its fallout, see Nate Schweber and Jo Becker, "For a Reported Penn State Victim, a Search for Trust," New York Times, November 23, 2011, p. B13.

And an Associated Press story reveals the day-to-day impact of the internal power of big time sports on what is otherwise an academic institution:

Vicky Triponey, Penn State's "standards and conduct" officer, whose responsibility it was to enforce discipline, resigned in 2007. She had emailed Penn State President Graham Spanier on August 12, 2005,

"[Paterno] is insistent he knows best how to discipline his players ... and their status as a student when they commit violations of our standards should NOT be our concern ... and I think he was saying we should treat football players different from other students in this regard. . . . Coach Paterno would rather we NOT inform the public when a football player is found responsible for committing a serious violation of the law and/or our student code, despite any moral or legal obligation to do so." . . .

Triponey said that throughout her tenure at Penn State there was "an ongoing debate" over who should deal with misconduct by football players.

Her 2005 email was sent the day after a heated meeting in which Paterno complained about the discipline process.

"He knew better than anyone how to discipline them. We wanted to show him the (disciplinary) data and suggest that `Well, whatever it is we're doing, it's not working.' They're getting into trouble at a greater rate than they should. We wanted to find a way to address that," she said. "The meeting ended up being a one-sided conversation with the coach talking about his frustrations, his anger, his not being happy with the way we were running the system." . . .

A review of Associated Press stories over the last decade shows at least 35 Penn State players faced internal discipline or criminal charges between 2003-09 for a variety of offenses ranging from assault to drunk driving to marijuana possession. One player was acquitted of sexual assault. . . .

[P]ressure to go easier on football players increased as her tenure went on.

"Many times, (because of) the pressure placed on us by the president or the football coach, eventually, we would end up doing sanctions that were not what another student would've got," she said. "It was much less. It was adapted to try to accommodate the concerns of the coach."

Seanna Adcox, "Ex-PSU officer questioned player treatment," Associated Press/CitizensVoice/Times-Shamrock [Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania], November 22, 2011.

November 28: The culture and institutional pattern continues. This blog began on November 8 describing a pattern of institutional response to those crises that involve behavior of officials ranging from the embarrassing to the criminal -- institutional cover-up, initial media reports, institutional denials (often vociferous), media confirmations, institutional professions of shock, calls for in-house investigations, apologies to the victims (whose claims were earlier dismissed), and assertions "this will never happen again" (until it does), institutional firings, normally of someone in the middle, saving the jobs of the coach and university president. There are, of course, some variations in this pattern, as we've seen at Penn State, where ultimately the coach and president were fired.

So now it's Syracuse. What was head basketball coach Jim Boeheim's response when stories emerged that his associate head coach, Bernie Fine, had sexually molested two young "ball boys" during Fine's 36 years at Boeheim's side? He said the men's charges were "a bunch of a thousand lies . . .. I believe they are looking for money. I believe they saw what happened at Penn State, and they are using ESPN to get money. That is what I believe.”

There it is: the cover-up, the early media reports, the vociferous defense (remember Penn State President's defense of the AD and VP charged with perjury?), and yesterday's media confirmations, in the form of a third man coming forward and the release of a taped phone call with Fine's wife in which she appears to be aware of his behavior. Now Fine has been peremptorily fired, the president and Boeheim still securely employed. So, next phase? Boeheim is shocked, shocked I tell you, calling for an in-house investigation, and professing an apology to victims: "I believe the university took the appropriate step tonight [firing Fine]. What is most important is that this matter be fully investigated and that anyone with information be supported to come forward so that the truth can be found. I deeply regret any statements I made that might have inhibited that from occurring or been insensitive to victims of abuse."

Isn't this just further evidence that the institutional failures accompanying big money, semi-pro athletic entertainment programs inside the academy are inevitable, systemic, and a part of the culture?

Penn State is not the "bad apple" in an otherwise flawless orchard. It is but one more example of a blight that can potentially strike any tree, and has. Pete Thamel, "Syracuse Fires Fine After New Allegations in Molestation Case," New York Times, November 28, 2011, p. D1.

December 1: "Earlier Wednesday, a new accuser who is not part of the criminal case said in a lawsuit that Sandusky threatened to harm his family to keep him quiet. The 29-year-old, identified only as John Doe, had never told anyone about the abuse he claims he suffered until Sandusky was charged last month with abusing other boys. His lawyer said he filed a complaint with law enforcement on Tuesday. He became the first plaintiff to file suit in the Penn State child sex abuse scandal a day later. . . . The lawsuit claims Sandusky abused the boy from 1992, when the boy was 10, until 1996 in encounters at the coach's State College home, in a Penn State locker room and on trips, including to a bowl game. The account echoes a grand jury's description of trips, gifts and attention lavished on other boys." Genaro C. Armas and Maryclaire Dale, "1st Penn State Abuse Suit Comes From New Accuser," Associated Press/Las Vegas Review-Journal, December 1, 2011.


December 3: "The former Penn State assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky, in his first extended interview since his indictment on sexual abuse charges last month, said Coach Joe Paterno never spoke to him about any suspected misconduct with minors. Mr. Sandusky also said the charity he worked for never restricted his access to children until he became the subject of a criminal investigation in 2008." [Photo credit: New York Times.] Jo Becker, "Center of Penn State Scandal, Sandusky Tells His Own Story," New York Times, December 3, 2011, p. A1.

December 12, 2100: One of the best overviews of, especially, the role of the "culture" surrounding the Penn State football program in permitting the continuation of Sandusky's behavior, is contained in this detailed and lengthy (3750-word) AP story: Brett J. Blackledge, Jeff Donn and Michael Rubinkam, "PSU culture explained away Sandusky," Associated Press/Yahoo.com, December 12, 2011 ("The warning signs were there for more than a decade, disturbing indicators that Penn State assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky was breaching boundaries with young boys — or maybe worse. . . . Too many, from the university president to department heads to janitors, knew of troubling behavior . . . [but] the circle of knowledge was kept very limited and very private. Year after year, Penn State missed opportunity after opportunity to stop Sandusky . . . — all part of a deep-rooted reflex to protect the sacred football program. The fact that so few say they knew is all anyone needs to know about the insular culture that surrounds Penn State — . . . a university cloaked in so much secrecy, in large part, because it is exempt from the state's open records law, and a football program that has prided itself on handling its indiscretions internally and quietly, without outside interference.").

December 17, 2011: Peter Durantine, "Penn State’s McQueary Tells Court What He Saw," New York Times, December 17, 2011, p. D1 ("A Penn State assistant football coach testified Friday that in 2002 he saw Jerry Sandusky sexually assaulting a young boy and that he reported it, in graphic detail, to Coach Joe Paterno and two senior Penn State University officials. “I described it was extremely sexual and that some kind of intercourse was going on,” the assistant coach, Mike McQueary, testified of the suspected assault by Sandusky, a longtime top assistant to Paterno.").

And see, Mary Pilon, "Scandals Test the N.C.A.A.’s Top Rules Enforcer," New York Times, December 17, 2011, p. D17 ("In terms of major scandals, this year has been one of the most calamitous in the history of college athletics. From reports in August about a University of Miami booster providing cash and prostitutes for its football players to sexual abuse allegations against Jerry Sandusky at Penn State and then against a Syracuse assistant basketball coach, fans and college officials alike have begun asking whether the big-money world of college athletics has sufficient oversight.").

December 20, 2011: Much has been written, and rightfully so, about the "culture" of college football, and, among other things, the widespread violation of, and difficulty of enforcing, NCAA rules regarding universities' administrative control of their big sports programs. In fairness, however, this might be as much a matter of institutional, or human, failing as of athletic programs' failing.

Consider a corporation's instinct to refuse to report a disaster, and then minimize its extent once reported. A police department's handling of an officer's killing an innocent civilian. The bank that never reveals a million-dollar embezzlement from inside, or a hack from outside. A military unit's characterization of homicide as mere "collateral damage." A hospital that denies the results of medical malpractice are anything more than an ordinary risk of surgery. Children who lie to their parents, parents who lie to each other, witnesses who perjure themselves on the witness stand.

These widespread examples do not make what was done in any of them right, but they do make each illustration less something uniquely associated with a given institution -- including college sports.

And so it is that we cannot express great surprise that the cover-up of Sandusky's failings by those running Second Mile were very similar to the cover-up by Penn State administrators. There is a heavy incentive, it seems, for anyone to want to avoid, or at least minimize, contributing to one's embarrassment (not to mention criminal self-incrimination). Brett J. Blackledge, Mark Scolforo and Michael Rubinkam, "Former 2nd Mile board members: We needed to know," Associated Press, December 19, 2011 ("Former board members of [Second Mile] . . . say its CEO never told them about a 2002 shower incident . . .. If they knew . . . they say they could have taken steps to better protect children a decade ago. 'Not one thing was said to us,' said Bradley P. Lunsford, a Centre County judge who served on the Second Mile board between 2001 and 2005. 'Not a damn thing.'").

December 23, 2011: How are these abusive relationships created? And even more puzzling, how are children persuaded to maintain them? One of the more instructive examinations of this form of child abuse from the perspective of the child emerges from an Associated Press interview with Bobby Davis of Syracuse. "Michael Hill, "Fine Accuser Felt He 'Owed' Coach," Associated Press, December 22, 2011.

Here's a sampling: "Bobby Davis was a basketball-crazy teen who was handed a virtual all-access pass to the world of big-time college hoops by Syracuse assistant coach Bernie Fine. . . . Davis heard halftime locker-room tirades from the legendary coach [Jim Boeheim], took shots at practice, sat courtside, hit the road and ate nice dinners. Davis, now 39 . . ., says the indebtedness he felt toward Fine made it hard to break from the man he claims molested him throughout his teens and into his late 20s. . . . 'As I got older, I understood more that Bernie had this power. You almost feel it's like a cult in a sense. You don't know how to get away . . .. And as more and more time went on, you feel indebted to him. You feel like you owe him.'"

January 12, 2012: Kevin Begos and Mark Scolford, "Penn State president to face alumni in Pittsburgh," Associated Press/Miami Herald, January 11, 2012, ("[Penn State President Rodney] Erickson is attempting to repair the school's image with alumni, faculty, staff, and students, more than two months since Sandusky was arrested, bringing with it controversy, criticism and contemplation. Some alumni have criticized the school failing to conduct a complete investigation before firing Paterno and ousting Erickson's predecessor, Graham Spanier, while decrying the school's leadership as secretive and slow to act.")

January 14, 2012: Sally Jenkins, "Joe Paterno’s first interview since the Penn State-Sandusky scandal," Washington Post, January 14, 2012, (“'I didn’t know exactly how to handle it and I was afraid to do something that might jeopardize what the university procedure was,' he [Joe Paterno] said. 'So I backed away and turned it over to some other people, people I thought would have a little
more expertise than I did. It didn’t work out that way.'”)

January 19, 2012: Pete Thamel and Mark Viera, "Penn State's Trustees Recall Painful Decision to Fire Paterno," New York Times, January 19, 2012, p. B15 ("The board, scrambling to address the child sexual abuse scandal involving the university and its football program, had already decided to remove Graham B. Spanier as president. Then, many of those present recalled this week, the tension in the room mounted. Joe Paterno’s future was next up. [John P. Surma, the chief executive of U.S. Steel and the vice chairman of Penn State University’s board of trustees] announced that an agreement appeared to have been reached to fire Paterno, too — the trustees having determined that he had failed to take adequate action when he was told that one of his longtime assistants had been seen molesting a 10-year-old boy in Paterno’s football facility. Surma, those present recalled, surveyed the other trustees — there are 32 — for their opinions and emotions before asking one last question: 'Does anyone have any objections? If you have an objection, we’re open to it.' No one in the room spoke. There was silence from the phone speakers. Paterno’s 46-year tenure as head coach of one of the country’s storied college football programs was over, and the gravity of the action began to sink in.")

January 27, 2012: Mark Viera, "Strong Words Resound at Tribute to Paterno," New York Times, January 27, 2012, p. B14, ("Phil Knight, the chairman of Nike, . . . in the memorial’s most riveting moment . . . lambasted Penn State’s board of trustees for firing Paterno . . .. 'It turns out he gave full disclosure to his superiors, information that went up the chain to the head of the campus police and the president of the school . . . The matter was in the hands of a world-class university and a president with an outstanding national reputation. Whatever the details of the investigation are, this much is clear to me: if there is a villain in this tragedy, it lies in that investigation, not in Joe Paterno.'”)

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UI's Alcohol Abuse: Look to Nebraska

December 28, 2009, 6:00 a.m.

In the 12 years that I spent on the council, I tried several times to get the council to pass a 21 ordinance. University of Iowa presidents Mary Sue Coleman and David Skorton also encouraged the council to pass such an ordinance -- along with the UI College of Public Health, the public school system and numerous others within the community. In fact, every piece of credible evidence presented to the council called for a 21 ordinance -- all of which the council ignored, choosing instead to listen to the bar owners and patrons of the bars.

-- Former Iowa City Mayor, Ernie Lehman, "Council's Moral Character Problem," Iowa City Press-Citizen, December 26, 2009, p. A11

"What Works" to Reduce Students' Alcohol Abuse
(brought to you by FromDC2Iowa.blogspot.com*)
And see, "UI's Alcohol Problem: Many Solutions, Little Will," December 16, 2009, with links to 30 related, prior blog entries.

There's good news and bad news about the University of Iowa's serious alcohol problems.

The good news is that UI isn't the only American university with this problem. The bad news is that the UI isn't the only American university with this problem. The devastation of young peoples' lives from alcohol abuse starts in the high schools and spreads across the nation's campuses.

Fortunately, there's even better news. There are solutions.

Last week, Penn State students' alcohol abuse -- and the solutions being used on other campuses -- became the subject of an hour-long NPR radio program of great relevance to Iowans.

"This American Life," with host Ira Glass, is a weekly radio program from Chicago's WBEZ-FM carried nationwide by some 500 NPR stations each week. This award-winning program will soon have been on the air continuously for 15 years. Acknowledging that the program is hard to describe, its Web site makes this effort: "There's a theme to each episode, and a variety of stories on that theme. It's mostly true stories of everyday people, though not always."

Last week's program certainly involved the "true stories of everyday people" and had as its "theme" the scourge of alcohol abuse by college students -- with a focus on those at Penn State, the nation's "number one party school." "#1 Party School," "This American Life,"No. 396, December 18, 2009.

You can listen to the entire program from that linked site. And if this is an issue for which you have actual responsibility you probably should. However, Ira divides the show into "Acts," and for my purposes at the moment I'm going to concentrate on "Act Four" (the last 19 minutes). (If you'd like to limit your listening to that "Act," and your player enables you to see how many minutes into it you are, slide it to minute 46 and start there. Unfortunately, the show does not make transcripts available; although I wish it would do so at least occasionally, and this would have been one of those occasions. What follows is based on my relatively thorough notes from Act Four.)

Act Four focuses on what we can do about it -- here in Iowa City, as well as on other campuses.

Perspectives on Penn State's Problems.

First, some of the facts from Penn State -- most of which are reflected at the UI as well.

Every year 1700 college students die of alcohol related injuries. And the problem seems to be increasing. What used to be five drinks a night at Penn State has become 8, 9 and 10. Students admitted to the Penn State hospital for alcohol poisoning, or other alcohol abuse-related conditions, have been coming in with steadily rising levels of blood alcohol -- now some three times the legal limit. The show notes that normal drinkers could never reach those levels; they would either throw up or fall asleep first.

Like Iowa, Penn State has spent millions attacking the problem. Administrators have tried to teach students about safer drinking, created alcohol-free halls and dorms, task forces and town-gown commissions, alcohol-free late night activities (including stand-up comics and movies) -- but "obviously, this hasn't gotten the job done."

Linda LaSalle, Penn State's coordinator of health education services, has tried teaching students about blood alcohol levels and alcohol poisoning, offers a mandatory online alcohol education program for incoming freshmen ("Alcohol Edu"), and a social norms media campaign that makes the point that most students drink less than incoming first years think they do.

The result? Great knowledge gains (after all, they've been admitted to the university on the basis of their ability to retain and repeat what teachers say) -- but no significant behavior changes. LaSalle says they still drink as much or more than they ever did, and acknowledges that there are many things that contribute to this problem that are out of her control.

As Bob Saltz of the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation puts it, universities are not well suited to resolving these problems; academics tend to think they can simply teach kids to drink less; as Penn State's (and Iowa's) experience shows, they can't. Moreover, while Penn State and other schools may have lots of programs, they often fail to evaluate what they're doing, and therefore don't know what works and what doesn't.

Dead drunk. Universities do tend to launch a range of campus responses following alcohol-related student deaths -- and the adverse publicity they bring the school.

But it turns out that even alcohol-related deaths seem to have little impact on students' actual alcohol consumption. This past September a Penn State student died from a fall while climbing a wall at 3:30 a.m., drunk after a frat party. There were similar deaths in 1993, 1987, 1984, 1983.

So what is the student reaction? When a girl fell to her death from sixth story window in 1997 the newspaper expressed it: the death, it said, "may prompt party goers to keep a closer eye on each others' safety." This year students said of the most recent death, not that the dead student shouldn't have consumed so much alcohol, but that "he would be alive today if only he didn't drink alone."

Sadly, this appears to be the primary message of the otherwise very informative, powerful and emotionally moving quality documentary, "Haze," which I watched only after uploading this blog entry. Indeed, the final screen says, simply, "Save a life. Make the call" -- meaning, when your fraternity brothers pass out and are at risk of dying from alcohol poisoning, don't ignore how serious this can be, take some responsibility for them, a major part of which is a call to 911.

In fairness, "make the call" is certainly good advice. Moreover, it's an understandable focus for the film, given that the Gordie Foundation had its genesis in the aftermath of a student's death from alcohol. And as the This American Life program makes clear, to have devoted the film to solutions, rather than the problem and its consequences, would have been a different documentary. Nonetheless, it is a long way from a presentation of solutions, let alone those of UNL and Lincoln, described below.

However, that, and the seemingly constant interruptions from very loud commercials, are the only downside to this otherwise excellent documentary.

It's available near the bottom of this blog entry, and from the Web site of the Gordie Foundation, named for Gordon Bailey, who died from excessive alcohol in a University of Colorado fraternity in 2004. The award-winning documentary was produced by the Colorado Springs film company, Watt Imagination! and directed by Pete Schuermann.

Of course the 1700 college student deaths that are alcohol related are tragic for everyone involved, as this film so dramatically shows. (The knowledgeable John Neff challenges this figure as too high in a comment on this blog entry. My response: (1) it is certainly a widely accepted number, (2) whatever the actual numbers may be, even one death is too many. As Penn State's Linda LaSalle says, no college student should ever die because they had too much to drink, and (3) my instinct is that there is a greater likelihood of under reporting of alcohol-related deaths than over reporting, for example, a student who falls to her death while drunk may be recorded as having died from "an accident" rather than from an "alcohol-related accident." Ditto for injuries from a fight, a reported rape, or an unwanted pregnancy; those reporting, or otherwise discussing such occurances, may not know, or not mention if they do, that alcohol was very much involved.)

But as tragic as college students' needless deaths may be, regardless of their number, they are but a very small percentage of the total number of college students who suffer the unwanted consequences of their own, or others', excessive drinking in the form of alcohol-related accidents, fights, unwanted sex and pregnancy, failing or dropping out of college, alcohol addiction, drunk drivers, crimes of various kinds (alcohol is involved in roughly half of all crimes, give or take), alcohol poisoning (from which they recover rather than die), or other undesirable medical consequences.

And that is where this film shines. It sets out to make the case that college students' excessive alcohol consumption is a serious problem, and it does so with a power I've never before seen in a mere 81 minutes of film and scenes of which most parents are presumably unaware.

You can watch it from this blog, if you wish. It's available near the bottom of this blog entry. Regardless of your attitude about college drinking, I challenge you to watch it and still come away saying the equivalent of, "What's the problem? Boys will be boys. Let the kids have their fun."

Who is most involved in binge drinking? First year entering students who are white and male; the emergency room admissions in September are much higher than for the rest of the year.

A further complexity is that while the heaviest drinkers are naturally at the highest risk of getting hurt, there really aren't that many of them. It is the moderate drinkers, who vastly outnumber them, who are also victims from a rare over consumption by themselves or others -- incidents for which it is very hard to predict who will be involved and when they will occur.

The Solutions

Bob Saltz, from the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, says the answer is sort of a no-brainer: "You reduce risk by limiting kids' access to alcohol; the less alcohol is available the less kids drink; the less they drink the fewer bad things happen." (The Institute is a public health research organization that includes the causes and consequences of college students' alcohol abuse in its definition of "public health.")

Well, great. But how do you limit "kids' access to alcohol"?

In practice what this means is a police crackdown and, just as important, the students' perception of one. Until recently there wasn't much research to back up Saltz' hunch. Now there is.

Saltz' has completed an NIH-funded study at 14 California campuses.

Half the campuses instituted police "party patrols" that broke up large off-campus parties, stepped up drunk driving enforcement, and enforcement of laws against sales to minors in bars. Moreover, they heavily publicized this stepped up enforcement, so students would start self-policing rather than risk getting busted.

The results? Fewer kids were getting drunk. Campuses where the police cracked down reported 6000 fewer drunk students from off-campus parties and 4000 fewer from bars.

Contrary to the oft-repeated theory that strict enforcement will just cause students to select new venues for their binge drinking (see, e.g., John Neff's comment, "advantages and disadvantages of a 21 only ordinance," on my prior alcohol blog entry), the enforcement of the law in bars and at off-campus parties did not lead to those parties just moving elsewhere, such as a public park, or dormitories.

"Go West, young man -- to Nebraska." The show's Sarah Koenig asked Saltz if he could tell her of any university with sustained success. "Yes," he replied, "University of Nebraska, Lincoln."

In 1998 the University of Nebraska teamed up with the City of Lincoln and together they declared a data-driven, goal-oriented all out war on out-of-control drinking.

What did they do?

Everything. There was a police crackdown. They enlisted the help of bar owners, legislators, liberal arts students, business students, and high school principals. They lobbied to digitize Nebraska's drivers licenses. They even tried to knock down the average number of drinks on a student's 21st birthday from 14 to 7.

Linda Major, Assistant to the Vice Chancellor at UNL, was the general in this war. Breaking up wild parties in residential neighborhoods was one of the most controversial things they did early on, but also one of the most effective. "Over time the party patrol went out very few weekends, but people believed it could happen any weekend."

The results? There have been far fewer complaints from Lincoln residents about UNL students' drunken behavior. Students report they are studying more and getting more sleep. There were fewer drop outs, reports of unwanted sex, and arrests for driving drunk. Way more freshmen were abstaining entirely from alcohol. And the proportion of UNL students engaging in binge drinking sank from 63% of the student body in 1997 down to 42% by 2007.

Why haven't Penn State (and the University of Iowa) had results like this? Because, says Saltz, they refuse to do what UNL has done: "join with the town and declare total war." Why won't they ban alcohol from the dorms? Or take on the widespread underage drinking? Or punish students more harshly; expell them even, when they break the law?

Damon Simms, is Penn State's VP for Student Affairs. He has met with virtually everybody: the town manager, editor of the local paper, city council, student government, university police, faculty, and fraternity leaders. He has a list of ideas that is 72 items long, and says that sacred cows need to be reconsidered: grade inflation, troublesome fraternities, out-of-control tailgating. So far he's established new sanctions for students who break alcohol laws; fraternities have new rules (such as no more Wednesday night parties; on other nights a photo ID required for entry, and there must be bouncers to enforce the rules). But he is not optimistic any, or all, of these ideas will make a major difference.

Proposal and Conclusion.

I have long argued, in some 30 blog entries on this subject, that the University of Iowa's inability to solve its alcohol problem is not the result of a lack of possible solutions or resources. It is the lack of will. There's nothing in This American Life's "#1 Party School" program to change my assessment.

But I do think that the results of Saltz' California study, and the impressive results from the UNL-City of Lincoln effort, help to reenforce my assertions that there are solutions available.

Here are some summary suggestions:

1. Keep in mind Saltz' simple insight and implied goal: "You reduce risk by limiting kids' access to alcohol; the less alcohol is available the less kids drink; the less they drink the fewer bad things happen."

2. Recognize the painful truth that even though we can successfully increase our students' knowledge about the adverse consequences of alcohol abuse, not even the best of this planet's world class universities can "teach" their students into drinking less.

3. As with any successful human undertaking, whatever we decide to do it should be sufficiently data driven and goal oriented that we can evaluate our results and become better informed regarding "what works" based on our own experience here in Iowa City. (UI's Provost Wallace Loh has made some suggestions in this direction.)

4. Recognize that until the leadership of the University (Regents, President and Vice Presidents) and City (City Council and City Manager) really want to actually change student behavior, as distinguished from public relations efforts, it is unlikely any meaningful change in that behavior will occur.

5. If and when that focused determination and agreement occur, it will be useful to designate a "general" to (a) come up with the "data driven, goal oriented" plan, (b) including the range of most promising approaches, and (c) involving the widest possible array of potential stakeholders in the solution.

6. Anything short of "an all out war on out-of-control drinking" is unlikely to be successful in significantly moderating students' drinking behavior. What the data from California and Nebraska suggest is that the most effective strategy for such a war is a combined City and University police crackdown on off-campus parties as well as drunken behavior, and underage drinking, in the bars -- including the enactment of a meaningful "21-only" ordinance. At the outset it would need to be relatively constant; but this could soon become more random (and less demanding of police resources) -- so long as the students' perception is that it could happen to them at any time, and that the consequences are severe. (Note that, while "underage drinking" remains an offense and is included as a target of the "war," the primary focus is on "drunk and disorderly" behavior and its tragic consequences.)

7. Football weekends are their own problem and it, too, is severe, especially for those in neighborhoods adjacent the stadium. It also needs to be addressed. But the football problems are limited to a half-dozen or so weekends a year.

8. From the standpoint of student health and safety (as distinguished from adverse impact on Iowa City residents), the far more serious problem involves the other 45 weekends of student alcohol abuse each year -- "weekends" of what The Daily Iowan describes as "80 Hours" (in a week of 168 hours) that run from Thursday through Sunday nights. There may be some overlap of strategies between the football and other weekends, but the focus of this blog entry -- and the success in California and Nebraska -- is on those far more numerous weekends when we don't have 70,000 additional potential drinkers in town.

Well, here's a plan for doing something meaningful about Iowa City's alcohol problem. Based on the California and Nebraska experience, it looks like it would work as well for Iowa City as it has elsewhere. If you have a better idea, put it in a comment on this blog entry.

Meanwhile, if you're a University administrator, or City Council member, or just generally interested in the issues, I seriously urge you to watch "Haze," the film discussed above, before speaking out, let alone voting, on matters related to alcohol. Here is the film:



If after watching it the leaders of the University of Iowa and City of Iowa City continue to do nothing meaningful about the problem we will then at least know that it is a purposeful and deliberate decision on their part to put the interests of bar owners over the health and safety of our students. It is not for a lack of available remedies.
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* Why do I put this blog ID at the top of the entry, when you know full well what blog you're reading? Because there are a number of Internet sites that, for whatever reason, simply take the blog entries of others and reproduce them as their own without crediting the source. I don't mind the flattering attention, but would appreciate acknowledgment as the source, even if I have to embed it myself. -- Nicholas Johnson
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