Wars Have Checklists. The U.S. Should Use Them
Nicholas Johnson
The Gazette, March 11, 2026, p. A6
If you mow your lawn with a push mower your checklist is short: (1) find mower, (2) push it through the grass.
If you’re planning a vacation, wedding, or Thanksgiving dinner, the checklist becomes longer. AI Gemini created for me an overwhelming, six-phase, multi-dates, times and dishes checklist for that meal.
What’s this got to do with our war with Iran? Simply that wars also have checklists, and it’s not clear whether we’re using them.
For starters, you can’t just have a war anywhere.
As Maritime Administrator in the mid ‘60s, I needed to travel to Vietnam. The White House asked that, while there I gather and share my thoughts about the war. My conclusion: “You can’t play basketball on a football field.”
That is, there are circumstances when war’s not an easy option (e.g., you can’t speak the language; don’t know the culture, history or territory; you wear uniforms, the enemy doesn’t; there’s no front line).
My analysis had no impact – except for the White House decision I’d do better as FCC commissioner than Maritime Administrator. Oh, and the Iowa women’s team showed it could play basketball on the Kinnick Stadium football field.
This month, as I’ve watched our military efforts spread from Iran to varieties of chaos for 15-middle-eastern-countries and beyond, it brought to mind a 34-year-old checklist proposed by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and his senior military assistant, General Colin Powell (referred to as the Weinberger, or Powell, “Doctrine”). It was a list of the considerations and questions they felt should be resolved before a war.
Was this working checklist known to, or used by, those civilians who are dictating to the military a variety of strategies and reasons for our latest war? Or did the White House assume there was no more need for checklists and planning than when pushing a mower through the grass?
For starters, my summaries of the Powell Doctrine do not assume war; they begin by asking:
Clear Objective: Do we have a precisely defined, attainable goal?
Goal: Is it sufficiently important, clearly defined, and understood?
Vital Interests: Is a key national security interest at stake?
Alternatives: Have all non-violent means been tried and failed?
Military: Will military air operations contribute, or impede, our goal?
Requirements: What will our goal require in troops, materiel, and lives?
Success: What will constitute “success”?
Risks & Costs: Is “success” worth the possible impacts, risks and costs?
Knowledge: Do we know the language, history, and terrain of the people?
Support: Will Americans, Congress and allies support a war? How long?
Exit: How can we leave without Vietnam or Afghanistan-like scenes?
Future: After we’ve left will the people be better or worse off, or the same?
Consistency: Will that be consistent with our original mission?
In the 1983 movie War Games, a computer counting down to a real “Global Thermonuclear War” is switched to tic-tac-toe. We might just conclude, as the computer did, that “The only winning move is not to play.”
Nicholas Johnson can be reached at mailbox@nicholasjohnson.org
Sources
“Around nine-in-ten Americans (91%) celebrate Thanksgiving.”
John Gramlich, Chip Rotolo and Laura Silver, “The vast majority of Americans celebrate Thanksgiving, but their traditions and activities vary widely,” Pew Research Center, Nov. 21, 2024,
https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/11/21/the-vast-majority-of-americans-celebrate-thanksgiving-but-their-traditions-and-activities-vary-widely/
Nicholas Johnson, GENERAL SEMANTICS, TERRORISM AND WAR
ETC: A Review of General Semantics
Vol. 64, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 45-64 (20 pages)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/42578697
Wikipedia, Powell Doctrine
The "Powell Doctrine" is a term named after General Colin Powell, for a military doctrine that Powell created in the run-up to the 1990–1991 Gulf War. The doctrine poses questions emphasizing national security interests, overwhelming strike capabilities with an emphasis on ground forces, and widespread public support,[1] all of which have to be answered affirmatively before military action is taken. Powell's doctrine is based in large part on the Weinberger Doctrine, devised by Caspar Weinberger during his tenure as Secretary of Defense (at which time Powell was Weinberger's senior military assistant).
The Powell Doctrine states that a list of questions all have to be answered affirmatively before military action is taken by the United States:[2][3]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell_Doctrine#:~:text=5.1%20Primary%20sources-,Summary,been%20fully%20and%20frankly%20analyzed%3F
Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power," National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1984, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weinberger_Doctrine ; also The Historian of the U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v01/d219
“Maj. Gen. Colin Powell was [Secretary of Defense] Caspar Weinberger’s recently appointed military assistant when I met him in the fall of 1983.”
Dov S. Zakheim,” Colin Powell believed in leadership — and he was a smart, popular leader,” The Hill, Oct. 29, 2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/577333-colin-powell-believed-in-leadership-and-he-was-a-smart-popular/
Best source for the text of "The Powell Doctrine,"
https://www.google.com/search?sourceid=chrome&udm=50&aep=42&source=chrome.crn.rb&q=Best+source+for+the+text+of+%22The+Powell+Doctrine%22&mstk=AUtExfDMvkn9zMGRd0WCultfqnCLjL3MYLg_5Z2mfRnsc68FXmWS0FYHv5FGKEJV5sTcoUi8CC5_-DS2gf8Zk3MLv7AJJSn_LtioLUjX6E1Xxe1XO0QmOcP520d6GebaamsAfMoTDToWEHK3pTnsOEfmPoM5WF3Ya4UJXsxggq4RgCGGt2fPcMWYchZbgHfNAt6K6IOHnpTuy5f08nTAJK9QZKU3E0fUlRKmSPS_VTpTMBpG6gxsoKnNElFPr2ftxIjasQG0PSRz2RPqEMD855Mh_zpSQVYWcsZ2F0w4PqcydYVnhtE4eG6jWTs_SeLTuRY27jSZRMn-HWkY0Q&csuir=1&mtid=mlSsaZ_vKMDtptQPm5XemQo
The "Powell Doctrine" is not a single, signed legislative document but rather a set of principles derived from General Colin Powell's writings and military strategy. The most authoritative "text" for the doctrine is found in his 1992 article "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead" published in Foreign Affairs.
Primary Sources
"U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead" (Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992): This is the definitive essay where Powell articulated the "relevant questions" that must be answered before committing force.
The National Military Strategy (1992): As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell authored this official Department of Defense document that codified the "Base Force" concept and the strategic shift to post-Cold War regional contingencies.
"The Uses of Military Power" (1984): While technically the Weinberger Doctrine, this speech by then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger is the direct precursor to Powell's ideas. Powell served as Weinberger's senior military assistant when these six tests were developed. [Access to Foreign Affairs requires a subscription.]
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms1992.pdf
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