Rational Responses to Stolar and Global Finance

September 20, 2008, 9:00, 11:30 a.m.

FromDC2Iowa.blogspot.com
Currently Most Popular Blog Entries
"University of Iowa Sexual Assault Controversy -- 2007-08," July 19-present (incorporating and updating original blog entry, "UI Sexual Assault Update," July 19-August 9).
"Extra: Stolar Report," September 18 and 19, 2008.
"How Much Do You Owe the Chinese?" September 8, 2008.
"Police Accidental Shootings -- Of Themselves," May 9, 2008.
"Growing Iowa's Economy the Right Way," April 27, 2008.
"Alcohol Update," September 6, 2008.
"Violence at City and West High," December 15, 2007.
"Governor Sarah Palin," September 4, 2008.
"Greenbelts for Grandchildren," February 15 and 20, 2008.
"More Awards, Understanding and Survival Skills," September 16, 2008.

And see, Database Index of 500-plus blog entries

Stolar Follow-Up and the Case for Mills and Jones
As always, the best single source for current and background materials, documents, and links to newspaper coverage and more is to be found at "University of Iowa Sexual Assault Controversy -- 2007-08," July 19-present (incorporating and updating original blog entry, "UI Sexual Assault Update," July 19-August 9) -- to no one's surprise the most popular site here yesterday. Some eight new newspaper articles and editorials have been added there this morning. (And see that source for summaries of, and links to, the editorials and stories referred to below.)

"'The Case for Mills and Jones'?!" you exclaim.

Well, yes and no.

No, I'm not defending the behavior of either as presented, and criticized, in the Stolar Report. But I did get your attention, didn't I? And I don't think peremptory firings are appropriate -- for the reasons set forth below.

Normally I find myself in agreement with much that appears on the Register's editorial page from its editorial board and columnists. But this morning they went to bat twice and struck out both times in my opinion when they suggest that Mills and Jones should be fired and that it is the Regents who should be drafting new procedures.

A desire for self-preservation is only human. But it often interferes with our ability to understand systemic institutional failures when the most popular response is to scapegoat someone -- other than oneself, of course.

o FEMA's Michael Brown was not the sole reason for the institutional disaster that followed the Katrina disaster.

o Ralph Nader was not the sole (or even primary) reason for the failure of the Democratic Party's presidential campaigns in 2000 and 2004.

o And Marc Mills and Phil Jones were not the sole reason for the University of Iowa's disorganized and chaotic response to the alleged sexual assault of last October 14.


The Gazette's morning editorial acknowledged "[the] university’s mistakes, miscommunication and inconsistent actions [and the] lack of understanding and leadership [that] made a terrible situation worse [as] too many university leaders did too little to make sure the [situation] was handled humanely and efficiently." Editorial, "Inquiry Must Lead to Swift Changes," The Gazette, September 20, 2008, p. A4.

And, as he so often does, the Press-Citizen's classy editorial cartoonist, Bob Patton, captures it with a stroke of his pen this morning under his heading of, "The Heat is On." [Credit: Bob Patton and the Iowa City Press-Citizen, September 20, 2008, p. A21.]

The drawing shows the "Stolar Partnership" "Investigation into U.I. Handling of Sex Assault Case" as a magnifying glass focusing the heat -- like a small boy using a magnifying glass to cremate ants on a summer's day -- on Mills and Jones, while UI President "Mason" and "Rest of UI Administration" stand on the shady sidelines.

So, what's wrong with focusing on Mills and Jones?

"Let me count the ways."

1. It's unfair. As The Gazette acknowledges, and Patton portrays, there's plenty of blame to go around to all of those "too many university leaders."

2. Orderly and balanced personnel review. The Regents set the example: President Mason's performance review was bifurcated, as the Regents first considered (on September 17) her accomplishments and failings separate and apart from her handling of this sexual assault case, and will subsequently consider the latter.

Every employee's performance can be reviewed periodically. And when Mills and Jones next come up for review they should be entitled to no less consideration than President Mason: how they performed with regard to this case (however seriously deficient it may, ultimately, be found to be) should be considered within the context of their overall performance.

Peremptory dismissals -- the petulant, retaliatory, scapegoating firing of employees -- are as counterproductive as they are inappropriate and unfair.

3. The back story. Neither Marc Mills nor Phil Jones have had an opportunity to fully and candidly tell their side of the story.

Is it possible that Mills was not on a "frolic and detour" of his own, but was in fact doing either what President Mason directly told him to do, or what he assumed, based on prior experience, she would want him to do? Is it possible that Jones had a prior experience with the football culture that permeates the University, and experienced what happens to those who dare to challenge it, and knew it would be counterproductive as well as personally risky to challenge the Athletic Department's "informal procedure" in this case?

I'm not suggesting for a moment that either -- or other possible scenarios -- are true. How could I know? All I'm suggesting is that there may be some explanations for their behavior other than the knee-jerk conclusion that "both are ignorant, incompetent, unfeeling SOBs who must be blamed for all that happened and peremptorily fired."

And note that both are "damned if they do, and damned if they don't" reveal their back story.

Based on the refusal of virtually all administrators to speak to the media about this case and the UI's procedure for handling it since last October, one possibility is that they've been instructed by President Mason not to. If that's the case, for them to tell their side of the story either to the Stolar investigators or the media -- especially if their story involves putting more of the responsibility on her -- would not bode well for their continued employment by the University. And even if they were to wait to speak out until after being fired, that would scarcely endear them to any potential future employer.

4. "Take me to your leader." For The Gazette to talk about the University's "lack of leadership" suggests that the University has a leader. Indeed it does. It is the President of the University of Iowa. Whatever happened to "the buck stops here"?

Patton is right. President Mason has been given "a base on balls" by Stolar, the media, many of the public, and the Regents (so far).

I'm not suggesting "this is all her fault" -- any more than it is all anyone's fault -- or that she should be severely punished in some way.

What I am suggesting is that both (a) in terms of what happened and why, and especially (b) what now to do about it, the Regents and their universities would have much to gain by understanding what was, and was not, done by the UI President's office to review, redesign and refine the University's procedures for handling sexual assaults by football players both prior to October 14 and since that day.

Especially is this so given what must have been known by all regarding the University's handling of the Pierre Pierce case. As the Press-Citizen editorialized this morning, "more than six years after the first sexual assault allegations against former Hawkeye basketball star Pierre Pierce, the University of Iowa still hasn't figured our how to handle such situations correctly."

Following October 14, what "management information reporting systems" did she have in place to track the Unviersity's handling of the case? What procedures does she have in place for monitoring not only crises, but the operation of the University generally?

After all, most of the Stolar Report's recommendations are kind of no-brainers: crimes should be reported to the police; alleged victims should have assigned advocates throughout the process; there ought to be a single office/clearing house; it should not be the University's general counsel; the function should not be merged in EOD with its responsiblity for sexual harrassment generally.

That's not to say we're not in the firm's debt for pointing them out. It's only to say that, once they do so, one's response tends to be, "Why, yes, of course. And why weren't we already doing that?"

It's one of those "which would be worse" choices. Would it be worse that neither the University president, nor anyone else in admnistrative positions, has thought to review its organizational structure and procedures for handling football players' sexual assaults over the past six years? Or would it be worse that a review was conducted during President Mason's first year in office but no one thought of any of the obvious remedies proposed by Stolar?

5. Diversion of focus. So a final reason why it's a mistake to focus on Mills and Jones is that it diverts the attention of the public, media journalists and editorial writers, Regents, and Regents' universities' administrators from the systemic, managerial and administrative problems that must be addressed if any meaningful progress is to be made.

Governance and Drafting the New Procedures

At the top I mentioned two Register editorials this morning with which I disagree. The second proposes that it is the Regents that should draft a new set of procedures for how the Regents' universities' handle athletes' sexual assaults.

I have written often and at length about the subject of board governance (board-CEO relationship) in general, Nicholas Johnson, "Board Governance: Theory and Practice," and with regard to the Iowa Board of Regents in particular, Nicholas Johnson, "An Open Letter to Regents on 'Governance,'" April 17, 2007 (with links to additional material of relevance to Regents' governance). And I'm not going to repeat all of that here.

The point, in this limited context, is that under a governance policy in which a board limits itself to setting what John Carver calls "ends policies" (and the rest of us might call "measurable goals") (and leaves it to the CEO to select the means for reaching those ends/goals), creating the specific structures, procedures, hiring practices and training programs -- or whatever else a CEO might choose -- for dealing with sexual assaults is the choice of the CEO, not the Board. The Board focuses on the results produced by the CEO in reaching the Board's ends/goals -- which constitute both the CEO's "job description" and the basis for his/her performance evaluation.

That's not to say, in this instance, that it would be inappropriate for the Board to express its dissatisfaction with what happened at Iowa this past year, only that the expression of that dissatisfaction should take the form of "ends policies" rather than specific procedures.

Moreover, rather than come up with a one-size-fits-all set of organizational structures and procedures, the Regents might at least want to consider starting with both present structures/procedures, and proposals, from each of the three universities. At a minimum, that kind of approach might come up with some creative ideas that would otherwise not be considered; and it might just be that there are very good reasons for having variations between the schools.

[More to come: the $1 trillion bailout.]

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Management by Disaster

October 4, 2007, 10:30 a.m.

Management by Disaster
Yesterday and the day before I was handing out awards for creative innovations in management. Nicholas Johnson, "Rational Economic Thought," October 2, 2007, 6:30, 10:00 a.m.; October 3, 2007, 7:15 a.m. (addition of Fire Chief Rocca's proposal).

Today's Gazette happens to contain four stories that illustrate the opposite. All share a common failing among administrators. It's what I call "management by disaster":

Cindy Hadish, "UI: Hospital Deficiencies Corrected," The Gazette, October 4, 2007, p. A1 (the original source was Clark Kauffman, "Violations found at U of I Hospitals; Inspectors: Errors imperiled patients; 9 deaths were not reported," Des Moines Register, October 3, 2007)

Erica Binegar, "Joensy's Owner Says Inspection Exaggerated; Solon Restaurant Ordered Closed by Health Department," The Gazette, October 4, 2007, p. B1

Rick Smith, "C.R. Police Morale 'Extremely Low,'" The Gazette, October 4, 2007, p. B1

"Airlines Mishandling Most Baggage in 20 Years," The Gazette, October 4, 2007, p. B9 (reprinted from the Washington Post; see Jonathan Mummolo and Del Quentin Wilber, "Now Arriving At Carousel 1, Far Fewer Of Your Bags," Washington Post, October 1, 2007, p. A1)

Now it is not my purpose to target any given individual for judgment with words or phrases such as incompetent, should be fired, ignorant, nobody cares, lazy, etc. To the extent possible I won't even mention anyone by name. Not only is it not very effective to engage in such criticism, but to draw such judgmental conclusions from the scattered information that can fit in a newspaper story is not likely to be well informed, fair or accurate.

Besides, it would run directly counter to the larger point I'm trying to make. I don't think the subjects dealt with in these stories are insignificant. But my focus is on the lessons they teach for everyone with administrative and managerial responsibilities, not the details of these four stories.

And those lessons are that "management by disaster" is (a) all too common, and (b) guaranteed to produce a continuing stream of disasters.

Management by disaster is waiting for 9/11 to occur before taking Ralph Nader's advice from decades earlier that airline cockpit doors should be strengthened.

Management by disaster is waiting to be overwhelmed with calls from angry parents about kids not being picked up by the school bus before putting procedures in place that require bus companies to demonstrate, before school opens, that they can run the routes in an accurate and timely fashion.

Management by disaster is responding -- after a Virginia Tech slaughter -- with improved communication on the nation's campuses. (And, at Iowa's universities, with the emotional enthusiasm for bringing more weapons onto campuses -- a "solution" at best totally irrelevant and at worst counter productive.)

Management by disaster is being more concerned about adverse public relations than what it is you're getting the adverse public relations about.

Do you remember the shocking revelations -- including pictures -- from the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq? Here's what I wrote about it at the time:

Given that Red Cross spokesperson Antonella Notari has said, "The photos are certainly shocking, but our reports are worse," how can one account for the administration's failure to respond to those reports?

As Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Senate, "It is the photographs, the people running around with digital cameras."

The problem, in short, was the public relations impact on American citizens (and possibly the president's re-election), and on Iraqis' "hearts and minds." The problem was not our pre-interrogation techniques, the problem was the pictures of those techniques. No cameras, no problem.

Before we get too shocked about this administrative response we need to reflect. Just how unusual is it?

Think back over publicized scandals involving deaths in hospitals, unsafe products, journalists' fraudulent stories, tobacco companies' lies, sexual abuse in the church, manufacturers' toxic dumps, or universities' athletic programs. How often have they involved facts well known to top administrators for some time? Or, if not known, facts that would have been known with even rudimentary monitoring and management information systems?

Nicholas Johnson, "Lessons from Abu Ghraib," The Daily Iowan, May 11, 2004.

One of this morning's stories, as it happens, does involve "deaths in hospitals."

Bear in mind, I'm not talking about disasters that would have taken the best-trained MBA by surprise. That can happen to anyone. I'm talking about pretty basic stuff that could have been, and should have been, anticipated.

Apparently the regulations involving the reporting of deaths of patients in restraints or in seclusion have been in place since January of 2007. (Does one really need a "regulation" before feeling a responsibility to report such a death?) Nine patients covered by this regulation have died; apparently none of the deaths were reported.

Somewhere between 25% and 40% of the patients in hospitals are suffering from what is called "iatrogenic" disease. And what is that? My dictionary says an iatrogenic disease is a disease "induced in a patient by a physician's activity, manner, or therapy. Used especially of an infection or other complication of treatment." In other words it's a condition caused by doctors and hospitals -- the roughly one-third of medical professionals who don't wash their hands thoroughly after using the restroom; prescribing or dispensing the wrong medicine, or quantity; rooms that haven't been adequately cleaned; amputating the wrong limb, or from the wrong patient. These causes are well known and have been for years. But so are the cures. This is not rocket science -- though it is medical science -- and dramatic improvements have been reported in hospitals that have taken the matter seriously -- before their negligence made the front pages of local papers.

Keeping track of everything going on in one of the nation's largest hospital complexes is one thing. (The UIHC represents a major share of the UI's 16.4 million square feet of building space.)

Keeping track of the sanitary conditions in one's modest-sized restaurant is another. Once again, the motivation ought not be concern about the adverse public relations -- not to mention loss of business as a result of being closed down by the Department of Public Health. A restaurant owner should want to maintain healthy conditions when handling and preparing food as a matter of quality control and avoidance of harm to customers -- as well as just having a more pleasant environment for owners and employees in which to work.

I don't have time, space or inclination to report everything a consultant uncovered and reported about the Cedar Rapids Police Department. Read the story. Once again, the point is that most of the problems that were uncovered could have been dealt with long before they were spread across the pages of the local paper.

And, not incidentally, the Iowa City City Council ought to want to review very carefully this experience and report from Cedar Rapids -- as well as the information about cities elsewhere that's available on the Internet -- before willy-nilly just increasing the number of Iowa City's police officers. There are loads of things that can and should be done first -- whether we add additional officers or not.

The airline baggage story is similar. In 2002 there were 3.84 reports of mishandled bags for every 1000 passengers. In July of 2007 there were twice that: 7.93 per 1000 passengers. This is another case in which management can't claim to be surprised. Lost luggage has been the subject of both furor and humor for years. And as the statistics indicate, things are apparently not getting better. Why would management want to wait for the embarrassment of the publicity surrounding this report from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics before taking action?

A CEO's participation in conferences, dinners, travel, speeches, and golf matches may or may not make a contribution to an institution's success. But they are not the CEO's primary responsibility.

There's a reason why CEOs are paid the big bucks -- some 450 times what they agree to pay their employees. They may believe in MBWA (management by walking around) or they may have MIS (management information reporting systems) in place -- or both. But whatever systems they employ they are responsible for being proactive, for anticipating problems (and opportunities), for putting procedures in place and then monitoring to make sure they're being followed.

You don't need an MBA and a multi-million-dollar salary to react to disasters on the fly, trying to make the best of a public relations black eye, and then locking all the doors on the barns that used to hold the horses.

Management by disaster may be widely practiced, but it's still "one hell of a way to run a railroad" -- a hospital, restaurant, police department, or airline.

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